MISTRETTA V. UNITED STATES
488 U.S. 361 (1989)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.
BACKGROUND: For almost a century, the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing. Statutes specified the penalties for crimes, but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how long, whether restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine. This indeterminate sentencing system was supplemented by the utilization of parole, by which an offender was returned to society under the 'guidance and control' of a parole officer. Both indeterminate sentencing and parole were based on concepts of the offender's possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate, and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return to society. It obviously required the judge and the parole officer to make their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of the offender's amenability to rehabilitation. As a result, the court and the officer were in positions to exercise, and usually did exercise, very broad discretion. This led almost inevitably to the conclusion on the part of a reviewing court that the sentencing judge 'sees more and senses more' than the appellate court; thus, the judge enjoyed the 'superiority of his nether position,' for that court's determination as to what sentence was appropriate met with virtually unconditional deference on appeal. Historically, federal sentencing -- the function of determining the scope and extent of punishment -- never has been thought to be assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches of Government. Congress, of course, has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime, United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820), and the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control. Congress early abandoned fixed sentence rigidity, however, and put in place a system of ranges within which the sentencer could choose the precise punishment. Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to determine what the sentence should be within the customarily wide range so selected. This broad discretion was further enhanced by the power later granted the judge to suspend the sentence and by the resulting growth of an elaborate probation system. Also, with the advent of parole, Congress moved toward a 'three-way sharing' of sentencing responsibility by granting corrections personnel in the Executive Branch the discretion to release a prisoner before the expiration of the sentence imposed by the judge. Thus, under the indeterminate sentence system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence within the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation), and the Executive Branch's parole official eventually determined the actual duration of imprisonment. Serious disparities in sentences, however, were common. To remedy these structural problems Congress passed the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act. The Act did not disturb the division of sentencing responsibility among the three Branches. The judge continued to exercise discretion and to set the sentence within the statutory range fixed by Congress. The prisoner's actual release date generally was set by the Parole Commission. Before settling on a mandatory guideline system, Congress considered other competing proposals for sentencing reform. It rejected strict determinate sentencing, because it concluded that a guideline system would be successful in reducing sentence disparities while retaining the flexibility needed to adjust for unanticipated factors arising in a particular case. The Judiciary Committee rejected a proposal that would have made the sentencing guidelines only advisory. The Act rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation, 28 U.S.C. 994(k), and it states that punishment should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2) and consolidates the power that had been exercised by the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission to decide what punishment an offender should suffer. This is done by creating the United States Sentencing Commission, directing that Commission to devise guidelines to be used for sentencing, and prospectively abolishing the Parole Commission. 28 U.S.C. 991, 994, and 995(a)(1). It makes all sentences basically determinate. A prisoner is to be released at the completion of his sentence reduced only by any credit earned by good behavior while in custody. 18 U.S.C. 3624(a) and (b) and it makes the Sentencing Commission's guidelines binding on the courts, although it preserves for the judge the discretion to depart from the guideline applicable to a particular case if the judge finds an aggravating or mitigating factor present that the Commission did not adequately consider when formulating guidelines. 3553(a) and (b). The Act also requires the court to state its reasons for the sentence [488 U.S. 368] imposed, and to give 'the specific reason' for imposing a sentence different from that described in the guideline. 3553(c). It authorizes limited appellate review of the sentence. It permits a defendant to appeal a sentence that is above the defined range, and it permits the Government to appeal a sentence that is below that range. It also permits either side to appeal an incorrect application of the guideline. 3742(a) and (b).
The Sentencing Commission was established 'as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States.' 991(a). It has seven voting members (one of whom is the Chairman) appointed by the President 'by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.' At least three of the members shall be Federal judges selected after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States. No more than four members of the Commission shall be members of the same political party. The Attorney General, or his designee, is an ex officio nonvoting member. The Chairman and other members of the Commission are subject to removal by the President 'only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown.' Except for initial staggering of terms, a voting member serves for six years, and may not serve more than two full terms. 992(a) and (b). The Commission was to promulgate determinative sentence guidelines, it is under an obligation periodically to 'review and revise' the guidelines. 994(o). It is to consult with authorities on, and individual and institutional representatives of, various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system. It must report to Congress 'any amendments of the guidelines.' 994(p). It is to make recommendations to Congress whether the grades or maximum penalties should be modified. 994(r). It must submit to Congress at least annually an analysis of the operation of the guidelines. 994(w). It is to issue 'general policy statements' regarding their application. 994(a)(2). And it has the power to 'establish general policies . . . as are necessary to carry out the purposes' of the legislation, 995(a)(1); to 'monitor the performance of probation officers' with respect to the guidelines, 995(a)(9); to 'devise and conduct periodic training programs of instruction in sentencing techniques for judicial and probation personnel' and others, 995(a)(18); and to 'perform such other functions as are required to permit Federal courts to meet their responsibilities' as to sentencing, 995(a)(22).
FACTS: Mistretta (petitioner) and another were indicted on three counts in a cocaine sale. Mistretta moved to have the promulgated Guidelines ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that the Sentencing Commission was constituted in violation of the established doctrine of separation of powers, and that Congress delegated excessive authority to the Commission to structure the Guidelines. The District Court rejected petitioner's delegation argument on the ground that, despite the language of the statute, the Sentencing Commission 'should be judicially characterized as having Executive Branch status,' and that the Guidelines are similar to substantive rules promulgated by other agencies. The court also rejected petitioner's claim that the Act is unconstitutional because it requires Article III federal judges to serve on the Commission. The court stated, however, that its opinion 'does not imply that I have no serious doubts about some parts of the Sentencing Guidelines and the legality of their anticipated operation.' Petitioner then pleaded guilty to the first count of his indictment (conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(b)(1)(B)). The Government thereupon moved to dismiss the remaining counts. Petitioner was sentenced under the Guidelines to 18 months' imprisonment, to be followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. The court also imposed a $1,000 fine and a $50 special assessment. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit, but both petitioner and the United States, pursuant to this Court's Rule 18, petitioned for certiorari before judgment. Because of the 'imperative public importance' of the issue, as prescribed by the Rule, and because of the disarray among the Federal District Courts, the Supreme Court granted those petitions.
ISSUE:
RULE OF LAW:
HOLDING AND
DECISION:
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
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