RAZOR V. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA 813 N.E.2d 247 (2004) CASE BRIEF

RAZOR V. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA

813 N.E.2d 247 (2004)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Hyundai (D) challenged a decision which awarded actual and consequential damages to Razor in her action alleging, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.S. 2301 et seq., breach of the manufacturer's written warranty and implied warranty of merchantability on a new car she purchased.

FACTS: Razor (P) purchased a new 2001 Hyundai Sonata GLS. D's new vehicle limited warranty covered the car for 60 months or 60,000 miles, whichever came sooner. P also got an alarm system installed into the car. The warranty provided the following coverage for the duration of the warranty: 'Repair or replacement of any component originally manufactured or installed by Hyundai Motor Company or Hyundai Motor America (D) that is found to be defective in material or workmanship under normal use and maintenance, except any item specifically referred to in the section 'What is Not Covered.'' The warranty stated that, 'in certain unique circumstances, Hyundai may decide, as a matter of goodwill, to pay for service or an item not normally covered by warranty.' The owner's manual for the car warned that the car 'should not be modified in any way' because 'such modifications may violate conditions of the limited warranties covering the vehicle.' The 'What is Not Covered' section of the warranty excluded coverage for damage or failure resulting from, among other things: -Use of parts other than Hyundai genuine parts, or parts of non-equivalent quality and design.- Any device or accessories not supplied by Hyundai.- Modifications, alterations, tampering or improper repair.- Parts or accessories used in applications for which they were not designed or not approved by D.' The 'What is not Covered' section also stated 'incidental or consequential damages, including without limitation, loss of time, inconvenience, loss of use of the vehicle or commercial loss.' P experienced problems and took the car to the dearlership to repair it five times for the same problem. P filed a complaint for breach of written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act; breach of implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act; revocation of acceptance under the Magnuson-Moss Act; and violation of the Illinois New Vehicle Buyer Protection Act. Following an arbitration finding and award in favor of P, D rejected the award and the case proceeded to trial. P testified as to the 5 incidents of the car not starting. Eventually the dealer checked the car's wiring, connectors and ignition switch and replaced the starter relay and trans range switch. The car was returned to plaintiff on December 7, 2001. Since December 7, 2001, P experienced no further problems with the car and, at the time of trial, continued to own and operate the car. She testified that her confidence in the car had been significantly restored, she used it to make a 60-mile round trip to work five days a week and a 44-mile round trip to church on weekends and had driven it over 20,000 miles. P was the sole witness in her case. The court denied D's motion for a directed verdict and D called its only witness, Randall Wood, part-owner and treasurer of ProSound, the alarm system that P had installed. He knew ProSound installed an alarm/remote starter system in the car and that P subsequently had problems starting the car. Wood stated that the original remote system in P's car included an anti-grind relay which prevented the car from starting if the ignition key was turned when the car had been locked with the remote control. When ProSound reinstalled the remote system in P's car, Wood instructed his installer to eliminate the anti-grind relay in order to eliminate the possibility that the car's failure to start was due to ProSound's installation. On reinstallation, Wood also had the tachometer wire, which monitors the car's engine and signals the remote to release the starter when the engine starts running, moved to a different location in the car in case it was unreliable and the cause of the failure to start. Wood also testified that the remote system might have a passive arming feature whereby, under certain conditions, the system would automatically rearm itself after 45 seconds and thereby prevent the car from starting. The court denied D's motion for a directed verdict. The jury found in favor of P on the breach of written warranty and breach of implied warranty of merchantability counts, and awarded $5,000 as breach of warranty damages, $3,000 for aggravation and inconvenience and $500 for loss of use. The jury found in favor of D on P's claim for breach of the Illinois New Vehicle Buyer Protection Act. P abandoned her revocation of acceptance claim. The jury answered 'yes' to a special interrogatory asking 'Did plaintiff prove the aftermarket remote starter-alarm system was not the cause of the no-start condition?' The court denied D's post-trial motion for judgment NOV or, in the alternative, to vacate the consequential damage award. The court granted P's petition for fees and costs, awarding her $12,277 in addition to the $8,500 damage award. D appealed.

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