SAHIN V. SAHIN
758 N.E.2d 132 (2001)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Wife (W) filed a complaint against Husband (H) seeking relief from a
prior divorce judgment. H moved for summary judgment. The Court granted H's motion. W
appealed.
FACTS: W filed a complaint against H seeking relief from a prior divorce judgment by
means of an independent equity action and pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6), 365 Mass.
828 (1974). W alleged that fraud perpetrated by H had resulted in a divorce judgment that
was manifestly unconscionable. H's motion for summary judgment was granted. and W appealed.
In the first action, W filed for divorce from H on June 30, 1994, following twenty-eight
years of marriage. The value of H's business was at issue. Based on all of the information
that was presented, the judge concluded that the fair market value of H's interest was
$4,912,717. The judge awarded H 100% of the outstanding shares but ordered him to pay the
wife 30% of the established value, or $1,473,815, in annual installments over five years. W
wanted cash instead of stock. The judgment became absolute on May 23, 1996. In January,
1999, nearly three years after issuance of the divorce judgment, Lucent Technologies, Inc.
(Lucent), announced that it was acquiring H's in exchange for 12.88 million shares of
Lucent, then valued at $1.48 billion. The sale was completed by March 1, 1999, and the
company became a wholly owned subsidiary of Lucent. W then complaint seeking relief from the
prior divorce judgment by means of an independent equity action and pursuant to rule 60 (b)
(6). She claimed irregularities in the huge disparity between the $4.9 million valuation of
in 1996 and its $1.48 billion sale price in 1999. W claimed that the gross discrepancy
between the estimated fair market value in 1996 and its established fair market value in
1999 could not be explained by any market condition, by the economy, or by any internal
changes in the company, including its product line or marketing strategy. It was W's
contention that this discrepancy was directly attributable to the husband's
misrepresentations and omissions during the divorce proceedings of material facts pertaining
to the company's financial outlook, which constituted fraud and denied the wife her day in
court. W had plenty of evidence that H told a different story in divorce court than what was
told to the rest of the world about company prospects. The judge first concluded that,
viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to W, there was no evidence that she
had been defrauded by H. Furthermore, even if she had been able to present evidence of fraud
by the husband, there was no exception in rule 60 (b) that would allow the judge to grant
the wife relief more than one year after entry of the divorce judgment. The Court entered a
judgment of dismissal on June 6, 2000. W appealed.
ISSUE:
RULE OF LAW:
HOLDING AND DECISION:
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
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