STATE OF KANSAS V. CALLAHAN
652 P.2d 708 (1982)
NATURE OF THE CASE: State (P) filed a disciplinary action against Callahan (D) for his
representation of a client in a real estate transaction.
FACTS: Fulton, an elderly woman, owned 320 acres of land, which she had inherited from
her father. The land had been leased to a neighboring landowner for a number of years.
Fulton decided to sell her land. A Lowell Lygrisse was in the market for such property and
Lygrisse called Fulton by phone and a tentative agreement was reached. Lygrisse suggested
that D handle the transaction for both of them. Fulton agreed, and retained D's services.
Fulton stated that she believed D would act as a California escrow officer would and protect
the interests of both parties. D testified that he believed that he represented both parties
as a scrivener to draw the papers and close the sale only after the terms of the purchase
agreement had been negotiated between the parties. D prepared two contracts. The first was a
purchase contract with $24,000 paid on closing and the balance paid in three installments of
$24,000 each for the next three years. The contract provided that the seller would execute
and deliver a deed to the buyer at closing, and that the land would be included with other
land in a mortgage to the Federal Land Bank. Fulton signed the contract in reliance upon D.
D forwarded a deed for signature. Once Lygrisse secured his loan from Federal, D would
purchase a certificate of deposit in the amount of $24,000.00 and pledge it as security for
the second payment, and that he would then formalize the agreement on the balance owing.
Fulton signed the deed and returned it. The second contract recited the schedule of payments
on the unpaid balance and set up an escrow of the certificate of deposit securing the first
annual payment due April 1, 1976. It provided for acceleration of the unpaid balance upon
default and gave Fulton a specific lien on the real estate covered subject only to the
Federal first mortgage of record. Fulton signed the agreement in reliance on D's request as
her attorney, believing it would place her in the position of a second mortgagee. Fulton
assumed D would record anything necessary to perfect her 'specific lien.' D was Lygrisse's
personal attorney, and they were each owner of 50% of the common stock of L-C Farm Co., Inc.
This transaction was not purchased for the account of L-C. D did not disclose his business
relationship with Lygrisse. Lygrisse defaulted on the final payment. Fulton contacted D
again and asked how long she had to file for foreclosure. D advised her that she had five
years from the date of default. Eventually D asked respondent to file a foreclosure action.
D declined, citing a conflict of interest. D did not advise them that they did not have a
secured interest in the real estate. Eventually D told them of the true situation; all they
had was a promissory note. Fulton filed a malpractice action against D. D filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy and was ultimately discharged. A formal complaint was filed against
D. The hearing panel found that D had violated DR 5-105 (B), DR 6-101 (A) (3), and DR 1-102
(A) (4).
ISSUE:
RULE OF LAW:
HOLDING AND DECISION:
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
Get
free access to the entire content for Mac, PC or Online
for 2-3 days and free samples
of all kinds of products.
for 2-3 days and free samples of all kinds of products.
https://bsmsphd.com
© 2007-2016 Abn Study Partner
No comments:
Post a Comment