ANDERSON V. OWENS CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.
Cal. Sup. Ct, 53 Cal.3d 987, 810 P.2d 549 (1991).
NATURE OF THE CASE: Owens (D) appealed a decision granting Anderson (P) a new trial in
his products liability action based upon D's failure to warn of a risk of harm.
FACTS: Owens (D) were manufacturers of products containing asbestos. Carl Anderson (P)
filed suit in 1984, alleging that he contracted asbestosis and other lung ailments through
exposure to asbestos and asbestos products while working as an electrician at the Long Beach
Naval Shipyard from 1941 to 1976. P allegedly encountered asbestos while working in the
vicinity of others who were removing and installing insulation products aboard ships. P sued
in negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability and, inter alia, prayed for punitive
damages. P proceeded only on his cause of action for strict liability and did not seek
punitive damages. P alleged design and manufacturing defects' which caused injury to users
and consumers, including P while being used in a reasonably foreseeable manner. A fourth
cause included allegations of failure to warn. P alleged that D marketed their products with
specific prior knowledge, from scientific studies and medical data, that there was a high
risk of injury and death from exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products; that D
knew consumers and members of the general public had no knowledge of the potentially
injurious nature of asbestos; and that Ds failed to warn users of the risk of danger. D
raised the state-of-the-art defense, i.e., that even those at the vanguard of scientific
knowledge at the time the products were sold could not have known that asbestos was
dangerous to users in the concentrations associated with Ds' products. P moved to prevent Ds
from presenting state-of-the-art evidence. P was proceeding, as to defective design, only on
the 'consumer expectation' prong of the design defect test. The trial court granted the
motion holding that state-of-the-art evidence is irrelevant to any theory of strict
liability. Ds then moved to prevent P from proceeding on the failure-to-warn theory on
grounds of waiver and fairness. P offered catalogs and other literature depicting workers
without respirators or protective devices and offered to prove that, until the mid-1960's,
Ds had given no warnings of the dangers associated with asbestos, that various warnings
given after 1965 were inadequate, and, finally, that Ds removed the products from the market
entirely in the early 1970's. Ds argued that what was scientifically knowable in the period
1943-1974, was their obvious and only defense to any cause of action for failure to warn,
and that, in view of the court's decision to exclude state-of-the-art evidence, fairness
dictated P be precluded from proceeding on that theory. The trial court granted Ds' motion.
The jury returned a verdict for Ds, finding in a special verdict that Ds' products had no
design defects. P moved for a new trial, asserting that the court erred in precluding proof
of liability on a failure-to-warn theory. The court granted the motion. The Court of Appeal
upheld the order granting a new trial. It added that, 'in strict liability asbestos cases,
including those prosecuted on a failure to warn theory, state of the art evidence is not
admissible since it focuses on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, which is
irrelevant in strict liability.' The dissenting justice urged that the majority had imposed
'absolute liability,' contrary to the tenets of the strict liability doctrine, and that the
manufacturers' right to a fair trial included the right to litigate all relevant issues,
including the state of the art of scientific knowledge at the relevant time.
ISSUE:
RULE OF LAW:
HOLDING AND DECISION:
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
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