IN RE WALT DISNEY CO. DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
    
    
      906 A.2d 27 (2006)
    
    
      
    
    
      NATURE OF THE CASE: This is another chapter in the never ending saga of the derivative 
      litigation over the firing of Ovitz at Walt Disney company over a decade ago.
    
    
      
    
    
      FACTS: All of these facts are necessary. Eisner at Disney first approached Ovitz about 
      joining Disney. Ovitz gave the cold shoulder. Then Meyers announced his decision to leave 
      CAA, and Ovitz, concluded that to remain with the company he and Meyer had built together 
      was no longer palatable. Ovitz became receptive to Disney. Ovitz came to believe that he and 
      Eisner would run Disney, and would work together in a relation akin to that of junior and 
      senior partner. Ovitz was mistaken. Ovitz owned 55% of CAA and earned approximately $20 to 
      $25 million a year from that company. Ovitz made it clear that he would not give up his 55% 
      interest in CAA without 'downside protection.' Ovitz would receive a five-year contract with 
      two tranches of options. The first tranche of three million options vesting in equal parts 
      in the third, fourth, and fifth years, and if the value of those options at the end of the 
      five years had not appreciated to $50 million, Disney would make up the difference. The 
      second tranche consisted of two million options that would vest immediately if Disney and 
      Ovitz opted to renew the contract. Neither party could terminate the agreement without 
      penalty. If Ovitz, for example, walked away, for any reason other than those permitted under 
      the OEA, he would forfeit any benefits remaining under the OEA and could be enjoined from 
      working for a competitor. If Disney fired Ovitz for any reason other than gross negligence 
      or malfeasance, Ovitz would be entitled to a non-fault payment, which consisted of his 
      remaining salary, $7.5 million a year for unaccrued bonuses, the immediate vesting of his 
      first tranche of options and a $10 million cash out payment for the second tranche of 
      options. Russell, a director who assisted in the negotiations expressed his concern that the 
      negotiated terms represented an extraordinary level of executive compensation. Russell 
      acknowledged that Ovitz was an 'exceptional corporate executive' and 'highly successful and 
      unique entrepreneur' who merited 'downside protection and upside opportunity.' Graef 
      Crystal, an executive compensation consultant, and Raymond Watson, a member of Disney's 
      compensation committee also evaluated the terms. Crystal concluded that the OEA would 
      provide Ovitz with approximately $23.6 million per year for the first five years, or $23.9 
      million a year over seven years if Ovitz exercised a two-year renewal option. This actually 
      approximated Ovitz's current annual compensation at CAA. Crystal was opposed to a pay 
      package that would give Ovitz the best of both worlds-low risk and high return. Eisner and 
      Ovitz reached a separate agreement. Eisner told Ovitz that: (1) the number of options would 
      be reduced from a single grant of five million to two separate grants, of three million 
      options for the first five years and the second consisting of two million more options if 
      the contract was renewed; Ovitz would join Disney only as President, not as a co-CEO. Ovitz 
      accepted those terms. The next day, Disney's General Counsel, and its Chief Financial 
      Officer, Litvack and Bollenbach, voiced concerns that Ovitz would disrupt the cohesion that 
      existed between Eisner, and them. They indicated they would not report to Ovitz. Ovitz then 
      became concerned about his 'shrinking authority' as Disney's future President. Eisner 
      reassured him and Ovitz acceded the new terms. Public reaction was extremely positive: 
      Disney was applauded for the decision, and Disney's stock price rose 4.4 % in a single day, 
      thereby increasing Disney's market capitalization by over $1 billion. The Disney 
      compensation committee met for one hour to consider, among other agenda items, the proposed 
      terms of the OEA. The committee voted unanimously to approve the OEA terms, subject to 
      'reasonable further negotiations within the framework of the terms and conditions' described 
      in the OEA. The Disney board met in executive session. It was told about the reporting 
      structure to which Ovitz had agreed, but the initial negative reaction of Litvack and 
      Bollenbach was not recounted. It would delay the formal grant of Ovitz's stock options until 
      further issues between Ovitz and the Company were resolved. The stock options were approved. 
      Ovitz began on October 1, 1995, the date that the OEA was executed. By the fall of 1996, 
      however, it had become clear that Ovitz was 'a poor fit with his fellow executives.' Disney 
      directors were discussing that Ovitz would have to be terminated. After 14 months Ovitz was 
      terminated without cause by Eisner, resulting in a severance payout of $130 million. 
      Attempts were made to trade Ovitz off to Sony so no severance would be owed but they failed. 
      Ovitz even reassured Eisner that he was now a company man willing to appreciate the unique 
      character of Disney management. Eisner even examined if Ovitz could be filed for cause or to 
      negotiate a lower payout but they were deemed to create further legal liability. On December 
      10, the Executive Performance Plan Committee met and awarded a $7.5 million bonus to Ovitz 
      for his services performed during fiscal year 1996, despite Ovitz's poor performance and the 
      fact that the bonuses were discretionary. The Committee knew that Ovitz was to be terminated 
      without cause. That bonus was later rescinded after more deliberate consideration, following 
      Ovitz's termination. Disney shareholders (Ps) brought derivative actions in the Court of 
      Chancery, on behalf of Disney. Ps claimed that the $130 million severance payout was the 
      product of fiduciary duty and contractual breaches by Ovitz, and breaches of fiduciary duty 
      by the Disney defendants (Ds), and a waste of assets. The Court of Chancery dismissed the 
      original complaint in 2000. On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal in part and 
      reversed it in part, remanding the case to the Court of Chancery and granting the plaintiffs 
      leave to replead. Ps filed their second amended complaint in January 2002. Eventually, after 
      extensive discovery, Ovitz moved for summary judgment. That motion was granted in part and 
      denied in part in September 2004. Ps have appealed from that judgment.
    
    
      
    
    
      ISSUE:
RULE OF LAW:
HOLDING AND 
      DECISION:
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
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