UNITED STATES V. MANSKE
186 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec. 846. Manske (D) seeks a new trial from based on
restricted cross-examination of the government's key witnesses.
FACTS: D was indicted for cocaine trafficking. The government got Stephen Pszeniczka and
Daniel Knutowski to plead guilty to charges including distribution of cocaine, and, with
their cooperation, successfully prosecuted others. They fingered D as their drug source. D
vigorously denied this. At D's trial, both men testified that between 1993 and 1996, D was
their primary supplier of cocaine. They alleged that D sold them 5.78 kilograms of cocaine
during the three years he was their supplier. Mary Colburn, testified that on three
occasions she either saw D deliver cocaine to Pszeniczka and Knutowski, or was nearby when
such drug transactions occurred. Another witness, Jackie Campbell, had no direct knowledge
of D's involvement in drug deals, but was able to provide inculpatory details against D that
were consistent with Knutowski and Pszeniczka's story. The government had no physical
evidence to corroborate the witness testimony against D. There were no surveillance
recordings implicating D, no cocaine found on his person or property, no money the
government could trace to illegal drug transactions and no admissions by D. The government
presented telephone records showing calls between D and Knutowski, but because their lines
were not wire-tapped the substance of the conversations was not identifiable. D testified
and claimed that he was involved in some illegal bookmaking with the witnesses. D had no
physical or documentary evidence with which to exonerate himself. D had to destroy the
credibility of the witnesses against him. D was able to impeach some of them with the deals
they made with the government and with their extensive history of drug use and drug dealing.
D also sought to cross-examine Pszeniczka about past acts of witness intimidation which the
government acknowledged had taken place, arguing that these acts were probative of
Pszeniczka's truthfulness. The government made a pre-trial motion in limine to block the
defendant from introducing any evidence relating to threats Pszeniczka made to various
witnesses who testified in a related case. The trial court kept out a half a dozen incidents
where Pszeniczka, or people acting on his behalf, allegedly threatened potential witnesses
in an effort to keep them from incriminating him. The government contends that under Fed. R.
Evid. 608(b) this evidence related to specific instances of conduct not probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness and that the threat evidence only went to show Pszeniczka's
propensity for violence, and therefore could not be admitted. The trial judge observed that
FRE 608(b) did not allow D to use the threat evidence to cross-examine Pszeniczka because
the threats '[did] not impact upon his credibility.' The court also stated that 'the fact
that there was a threat offered by Pszeniczka does not go to his character for
truthfulness,' but rather, to the 'character [for] violence and [Pszeniczka's] threatening
nature.' D was convicted and appealed.
ISSUE:
RULE OF LAW:
HOLDING AND DECISION:
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
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