BRADSHAW V. DANIEL, JR., M.D.
854 S.W.2d 865 (1993)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Bradshaw (P) appealed from a decision wherein the Court of Appeals
granted Daniel's (D) motion for summary judgment and held that the facts were insufficient
to show that the risk to a non-patient of contracting Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever was such
that a legal duty arose on the physicians' part to warn the non-patient of the risk of
exposure to the disease.
FACTS: Elmer went to the emergency room complaining of headaches, muscle aches, fever,
and chills. He was admitted under the care and treatment of D. D first saw Elmer on July 22,
1986, at which time he ordered the drug Chloramphenicol, which is the drug of choice for a
person in the latter stages of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. Elmer's condition rapidly
deteriorated, and he died the next day, July 23, 1986. The Center for Disease Control in
Atlanta confirmed the cause of death was Rocky Mountain Spotted fever. D never advised the
wife, Genevieve, of the risks of exposure to Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, or that the
disease could have been the cause of Elmer's death. A week after her husband's death,
Genevieve came to the emergency roam of Baptist Memorial Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee,
with similar symptoms of chills, fever, mental disorientation, nausea, lung congestion,
myalgia, and swelling of the hands. She was treated for Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, but
she died three days later, on August 4, 1986, of that disease. No patient-physician
relationship existed between Genevieve and D. Bradshaw, Genevieve's son sued alleging that
D's negligence in failing to advise Genevieve that her husband died of Rocky Mountain
Spotted Fever, and in failing to warn her of the risk of exposure, proximately caused her
death. D filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action on the grounds
that D owed Genevieve no legal duty because of the absence of a patient-physician
relationship. The trial judge denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict of $50,000
against D. P's motion for a new trial was granted. The trial judge again denied a motion for
summary judgment but granted D an interlocutory appeal. The intermediate court granted the
motion for summary judgment; the record did not contain sufficient facts to establish a risk
to Genevieve Johns which would give rise to a legal duty. P appealed.
ISSUE:
RULE OF LAW:
HOLDING AND DECISION:
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
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