Law School Case Briefs: October 2016

WASHINGTON MUTUAL FINANCE GROUP, LLC. v. BAILEY 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir.2004). CASE BRIEF

WASHINGTON MUTUAL FINANCE GROUP, LLC. v. BAILEY

364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir.2004).

NATURE OF THE CASE: Bailey (Ps), illiterate individuals, sued Washington (Ds), a financial institution and insurance companies. Ds filed in federal court and moved to compel Ps to arbitrate their disputes under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.S. 1 et seq. The court consolidated the cases and denied the motion to compel arbitration. Ds appealed.

FACTS: D provides among other things, consumer credit services. Ps obtained loans from D or its predecessors. As part of the same transaction, the illiterate Ps also purchased credit, life, disability, and property insurance from American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida, American Security Insurance Company, Union Security Life Insurance Company and American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida (the Insurers). Each of the illiterate Ps signed an agreement to arbitrate any disputes they might have with D. Eventually Ps began to figure out that they were sold insurance that they did not need or want. They sued in state court. In response, D brought separate federal actions under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) against Ps, seeking an order staying the state actions and compelling Ps to arbitrate their disputes. The Insurers who were also defendants in the state court suit, intervened. The district court consolidated the cases. The court found that they were illiterate and that D never specifically informed them that they were signing arbitration agreements. These facts and circumstances rendered the arbitration agreements procedurally unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. Ds appealed.

ISSUE:

RULE OF LAW:

HOLDING AND DECISION:

LEGAL ANALYSIS:

Get free access to the entire content for Mac, PC or Online

for 2-3 days and free samples of all kinds of products.

https://bsmsphd.com

© 2007-2016 Abn Study Partner

FROSTIFRESH CORP. v REYNOSO 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967) CASE BRIEF

FROSTIFRESH CORP. V. REYNOSO

281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the sale of a refrigerator.

FACTS: Frostifresh (P) negotiated a contract with Reynoso (D), a consumer, to buy a combination refrigerator-freezer. D agreed to pay $1,145.88. The contract was negotiated in Spanish with a Spanish speaking salesmen of P. D claims that certain sharp practices were used by P's salesman in that they would pay nothing for the unit because they would get $25 finder fees on the numerous sales that would be made to their neighbors and friends and that the they would be paid bonuses from work where in D had just one more week of work left. The contract was never translated into Spanish. The sales price of the unit was $900 with a credit charge of $245.88. At trial, P admitted the unit cost to them was $348. The trial court found the contract to be unconscionable. P appealed.

FROSTIFRESH CORP. v REYNOSO 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966) CASE BRIEF

FROSTIFRESH CORP. V. REYNOSO

274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the sale of a refrigerator. Frostifresh (P) filed an action for the amount owed on a refrigerator purchased by Reynoso (D).

FACTS: Frostifresh (P) negotiated a contract with Reynoso (D), a consumer, to buy a combination refrigerator-freezer. D agreed to pay $1,145.88. The contract was negotiated in Spanish with a Spanish speaking salesmen of P. D claims that certain sharp practices were used by P's salesman in that they would pay nothing for the unit because they would get $25 finder fees on the numerous sales that would be made to their neighbors and friends and that the they would be paid bonuses from work wherein D had just one more week of work left. The contract was never translated into Spanish. The sales price of the unit was $900 with a credit charge of $245.88. At trial, P admitted the unit cost to them was $348. The trial court found the contract to be unconscionable. P appealed.

TOKER v. WESTERMAN 274 A.2d 78 (1970) CASE BRIEF

TOKER V. WESTERMAN

274 A.2d 78 (1970)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Toker (P1), seller, filed an action seeking the remaining payments for a refrigerator-freezer sold to Westerman (D), purchaser.

FACTS: Westerman (D) bought a refrigerator from a door-to-door salesman working for People's Food (P). The total price of the unit was $899.98 and included credit life insurance, taxes, and interest, and D was obligated to pay a total of $1,229.76 under an installment sales contract. After paying $655.87, D refused to pay the balance of $573.89. P assigned its rights to Toker (P1) and P1 sued D for breach of contract. D alleged that the purchase price was unconscionable. The reasonable retail price for the unit was $400 at the time of sale. D appealed a judgment for P.

WEBB V. McGOWlN 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935); Certiorari denied 232 Ala. 374,168 So. 199 (1936) CASE BRIEF

WEBB V. McGOWlN

27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935); Certiorari denied 232 Ala. 374,168 So. 199 (1936)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal to recover on a promise to pay under an action in assumpsit. This was an appeal by Webb (P) from a judgment of nonsuit at trial.

FACTS: The complaint as originally filed was amended. The demurrers to the complaint as amended were sustained. Webb (P) was cleaning the floor of a mill. P was just releasing a 75-pound pine block to the floor below when he noticed that McGowin was standing directly under where the block would have fallen. In order to save McGowin, P fell with the block, and broke his arm and leg, and ripped his heel off. P was crippled for life. P was incapable of either physical or mental work. McGowin promised to pay P $15 every two weeks for the rest of P's life. McGowin followed through with the payments until his death about eight years later. After McGowin 's death the payments stopped. P sued N. and J.F. McGowin (D), the estate executors. D obtained a nonsuit against P. P appealed.

MILLS V. WYMAN 20 Mass. (3 Pick) 207 (1825) CASE BRIEF

MILLS V. WYMAN

20 Mass. (3 Pick) 207 (1825)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Mills (P) appealed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas issuing judgment in favor of Wyman (D) in assumpsit action to cover compensation for the board, nursing, and care of D's son.

FACTS: Levi Wyman was 25 and on a return voyage from sea and was helped by Mills (P). On his return from a foreign country, he fell sick among strangers, and P acted the part of the good Samaritan, giving him shelter and comfort until he died. Wyman (D), Levi's father, then wrote a letter to P to pay all the expenses for the care of his son. There was no consideration for this promise except that between the son and D. D decided not to pay. P sued for the payments. The court directed a non-suit because there was no consideration. P appealed.

SPARKS v. GUSTAFSON 750 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1988) CASE BRIEF

SPARKS V. GUSTAFSON

750 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1988)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute about payment from an estate for services given without the consent or knowledge of the estate. Sparks (D), executor, challenged a judgment, which ordered D's estate to pay Gustafson (P), manager, compensation for management services that P rendered to the estate and for maintaining and improving the estate property.

FACTS: Sparks Sr. and Gustafson (P) were friends and business associates. Sparks Sr. purchases a one-half interest in the Nome Center. P managed the building for Sparks Sr. without charge until Sparks Sr. died in 1981. P continued to collect the rents without the approval of Sparks Jr. (D). P did not request compensation for his services. P paid many of the operating expenses out of his own pocket but never informed D of these expenses. D wanted to sell the building to P but that deal was never completed. The building was sold to a third party in 1983. P then sued D for a breach of an oral agreement to sell the building to him. P also claimed a statutory or equitable lien upon the building for all the monies that he expended on the building. At trial, the court ordered the Estate to pay P $65,706.07 for services, and improvements.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ACOUSTICS CO., INC. v. C.V. HOLDER, INC. 456 P.2d 975 (1969) CASE BRIEF

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ACOUSTICS CO., INC. V. C.V. HOLDER, INC.

456 P.2d 975 (1969)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a contract bid. Southern (P) filed an action against Holder (Ds) school district and defendant general contractor seeking to recover for breach of contract, breach of statutory duty, and negligence in connection with a public contract. The lower court dismissed the action, and P appealed.

FACTS: Southern (P) submitted a telephone bid to C.V. (D) for furnishing and installing acoustical tile on a public construction job. D sued that bid on his prime contract. P was listed on that bid as required under law. D was awarded the contract and P found out about the award through trade papers. P then refrained from bidding other jobs in order to remain within its bonding limits. D then requested a substitution of P from the contract and it was granted by the school district. D claims that P was inadvertently listed in place of the intended subcontractor. P then sought a writ of mandamus to change the subcontractor designation back to what was previously listed. That proceeding was dismissed and P did not appeal. P then sued D for damages. D demurred and that was sustained. P appealed.

GROSS VALENTINO PRINTING CO. v. CLARKE 458 N.E.2d 1027 (1983) CASE BRIEF

GROSS VALENTINO PRINTING CO. V. CLARKE

458 N.E.2d 1027 (1983)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a breach of contract action. Clarke (D), publisher, sought review of a decision, which granted summary judgment in favor of Gross (P), printer, in an action by P for breach of contract.

FACTS: Gross (P) sued Clark (D) for a breach of contract over a dispute about the printing of a magazine. Layout problems with the magazine were encountered but P had assured D that the job could be done in house despite those problems. P informed D of a substantial price increase for the job. D made no objection to the increase until a later date. P delivered the first 5,000 magazines and D signed the purchase order reflecting the new price and paid P $4,650. After receiving the balance of the 15,000 magazines, D informed P that he would not pay the increased price. As a defense to the action, D asserted lack of consideration, fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation, and business compulsion in defense. P moved for a summary judgment and eventually the trial court granted P judgment of $5,116.20. D appealed.

LAKE LAND EMP. GROUP OF AKRON, LLC. V. COLUMBER. 804 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 2004) CASE BRIEF

LAKE LAND EMP. GROUP OF AKRON, LLC. V. COLUMBER.

804 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 2004)

NATURE OF THE CASE: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment grant to Columber (D), former employee after Lake Land (P), former employer filed a complaint asserting that D had breached a noncompetition agreement the parties had executed. The appellate court certified a question to the state supreme court.

FACTS: D worked for P and one day quit and started his own competing company. While working at P, D signed a noncompete agreement which provided that for a period of three years after his termination of employment D would not engage in any business within a 50-mile radius of Akron, Ohio, that competed with the business of D. P sued D claiming a breach of the agreement. Lake D's employment with P terminated in 2001. D admitted that he had been employed by P from 1988 until 2001 and that he had signed the noncompetition agreement some three years after he started working for P and that following his discharge from P he had formed a corporation that is engaged in a business similar to that of P. D pled lack of consideration in his answer. D moved for summary judgment, claiming that the noncompetition agreement was unenforceable. He asserted that the agreement was not supported by consideration and that the restrictions in the agreement were overly restrictive and imposed an undue hardship on him. D could not remember whether he had been told that his continued employment was dependent upon execution of the agreement or whether he had posed questions about the restrictions it contained. After the agreement was signed the at-will relationship of the parties continued for ten years thereafter. The trial court granted summary judgment in D's favor. Since D had 'no change in his employment status in connection with the signing of the noncompetition agreement,' there was no consideration to support the agreement. The court of appeals affirmed. It certified a conflict, however, between its decision and the judgments of other courts. The certified issue is 'Is subsequent employment alone sufficient consideration to support a covenant-not-to-compete agreement with an at-will employee entered into after employment has already begun?'

NEWMAN & SNELL'S STATE BANK v. HUNTER 220 N.W. 665 (1928) CASE BRIEF

NEWMAN & SNELL'S STATE BANK V. HUNTER

220 N.W. 665 (1928)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute about a widow's payment on a note made by her deceased husband. Hunder (D), widow, appealed from a judgment in favor of Newman (P), bank, in its action to recover monies allegedly owed by D on a note she had given to the bank in exchange for her deceased husband's note.

FACTS: Hunter (D) was the widow of Lee Hunter whose estate was insufficient to pay his funeral expenses and the widow's allowance. Newman (P) held a note from Lee for $3,700 secured by stock from Hunter Company as collateral. The company was insolvent. It was later placed with a receiver and its assets were insufficient to pay its debt. D paid P the interest earned and due upon the note for its surrender to her and gave P her note for the balance due. P sued D to recover from her note to them. D appealed a judgment for P.

RADKE v. BRENON 134 N.W.2d 887 (1965) CASE BRIEF

RADKE V. BRENON

134 N.W.2d 887 (1965)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a decree of specific performance for a contract for the sale of real estate. Brenon (D), sellers sought review of a judgment, which found for Radke (P) buyers in an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate owned by D.

FACTS: Radke (P) and Brenon (D) were neighbors. D offered to sell real property to P in writing. P orally accepted the terms of the letter. D later had to change the sales price by $50. P did not object to that increase. P then tendered a check for the $262 but was informed by D that the offer to sell was revoked. P sued and won. D appealed.

CHOMICKY v. BUTTOLPH 513 A.2d 1174 (1986) CASE BRIEF

CHOMICKY V. BUTTOLPH

513 A.2d 1174 (1986)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from the granting of specific performance on an oral contract for the sale of land. Buttolph (D), sellers, appealed from a judgment granting specific performance of an oral agreement to sell property to Chomicky (P), buyers, who cross-appealed from denial of their damage claim.

FACTS: Buttolph (D) offered a lakeside lot and summer cottage for sale. Chomicky (P) inspected the property and negotiated for its purchase. Both parties signed a contract drawn by P's attorney and subject to obtaining a subdivision permit. P telephoned D to discuss alternatives for closing the sale in the event that a permit was denied. D eventually agreed to the alternative. The permit was denied and D called P to tell them the deal was off. P sued for specific performance on the oral contract.

COPELAND V. BASKIN ROBBINS U.S.A. 96 Cal.App.4th 1251 (2nd Dist. 2002) CASE BRIEF

COPELAND V. BASKIN ROBBINS U.S.A.

96 Cal.App.4th 1251 (2nd Dist. 2002)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the enforceability of a contract to negotiate an agreement.

FACTS: Baskin Robbins operated an ice cream manufacturing plant in Vernon. Baskin announced its intent to close the plant and Copeland expressed an interest in buying it. Copeland made clear his agreement to purchase the plant was contingent on Baskin agreeing to purchase the ice cream he manufactured therein. After several months a deal took shape in which Copeland would purchase the assets and sublease the plant property. Baskin in turn would purchase 7 million gallons of ice cream over a three-year period. Baskin sent Copeland a letter detailing the terms that had been reached and that if the terms were acceptable they wanted a copy of the letter returned with a nonrefundable check for $3,000 and closing could be coordinated in 30 days. Copeland signed the letter agreeing to the terms and returned the letter and the deposit. After Copeland had accepted, the parties continued to negotiate the terms of the co-packing agreement. They agreed to the prices to be paid, the flavors, quality standards and controls, spoilage and trademark issues. Copeland believed that he had an oral agreement for a price of $.85 per tub but that they had not agreed on how the cost component was to be determined. Later that same year Baskin broke off negotiations, returned the deposit, and only wanted to proceed with a sale and lease of the plant assets but not the co-packing agreement. Copeland (P) sued for breach of contract in that Baskin (D) unreasonably and wrongfully refused to enter into the co-packing agreement. P claimed lost profits, lost employment opportunities and loss of reputation. D was granted a motion for summary judgment; the letter failed as a contract because the essential terms of the co-packing agreement were never reached. P appealed.

SUN PRINTING & PUBLISHING ASS'N v. REMINGTON PAPER & POWER CO., INC. 139 N.E. 470 (1923) CASE BRIEF

SUN PRINTING & PUBLISHING ASS'N V. REMINGTON PAPER &POWER CO., INC.

139 N.E. 470 (1923)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Remington (D) appealed from an order that reversed a denial of Sun's (P) 's motion for judgment on the pleadings in a breach of contract action.

FACTS: Sun Printing (P) agreed to buy and Remington (D) agreed to sell paper with monthly deliveries taking place over 15 months. The initial price points were agreed upon but when it came time to agree upon a new price the parties had a falling out. D gave notice that the contract was imperfect and disclaimed any future obligation to deliver. P demanded that D perform and claimed that the price to be agreed upon was an established and fixed price; no higher than the contract price for new print charged by the Canadian Export Paper Company to the large consumers. P sued.

POWER PARAGON, INC. V. PRECISION TECHNOLOGY USA, INC. 605 F.Supp.2d 722 (2008) CASE BRIEF

POWER PARAGON, INC. V. PRECISION TECHNOLOGY USA, INC.

605 F.Supp.2d 722 (2008)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Precision (D) moved to dismiss Power's (P) lawsuit for improper venue.

FACTS: P alleged a breach of contract and unjust enrichment due to D's alleged failure to pay certain amounts due under a contract entered into by D and P's parent company. This action arises out of the delivery of a single Motor Controller for an Aircraft Barricade Stanchion from P to D. The contract specified that the Product was to be delivered to D on July 31, 2006 and installed on a U.S. Navy ship. D's Purchase Order established a contract price of $464,962 for the Product and $78,908 for related field support. The Purchase Order provides that the laws of Virginia govern any disputes upon which the parties cannot reach a settlement and provide that 'venue shall be the applicable state or federal court in Roanoke, Virginia.' On September 11, 2006, the Product was initially shipped from P's facility to Michigan for functional testing; the Product was then shipped to New York for additional testing. P later performed the field services specified under the contract. On May 30, 2008, the Product was shipped to the Navy Shipyard in Newport News, Virginia for installation on board the Ship. The Product remains in Newport News. P was to be paid for the product in seven monthly payments. D paid $205,000 and failed to pay the remaining four milestone payments, totaling $260,000 and D refused to pay the $78,900 in invoices for post-delivery field support provided by P. P sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment to recover the unpaid costs.

SEAVIEW ASS'N OF FIRE ISLAND, N.Y., INC. v. WILLIAMS 69 N.Y.2d 987 (1987) CASE BRIEF

SEAVIEW ASS'N OF FIRE ISLAND, N.Y., INC. V. WILLIAMS

69 N.Y.2d 987 (1987)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the payment of association dues and fees. Williams (D) sought review of a judgment, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court in finding in favor of Seaview (P), homeowners association, in their action to recover assessments for the years 1976 through 1984.

FACTS: Seaview property owners were assessed a share of annual costs to maintain a rent free home for a resident doctor in the summer; shelters for lifeguards and Suffolk County Police, as well as snow fences, anti-erosion devices, a nature area, and recreational facilities. Ds owned homes in Seaview and refused to pay any of the assessments. The Association (P) sued them for the fees. The trial court gave the verdict to P by finding that D was liable under an implied contract; they bought the homes there with knowledge of the nature of the community and the conditions imposed upon ownership therein. D contended that they never used any of the facilities, and should not be obligated to pay unless they expressly agreed.

HOUSTON DAIRY, INC. v. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. 643 F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1981) CASE BRIEF

HOUSTON DAIRY, INC. V. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.

643 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1981)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute about a good faith loan deposit. Houston (P), challenged an order, which found Hancock (D) had both waived a seven-day limitation and validly accepted P's counter offer and that the parties had entered into a binding contract and awarded D the $16,000 deposit as valid, liquidated damages for breach of the loan agreement.

FACTS: John Hancock (D) mailed a commitment letter to Houston Dairy (P) to lend it $800k if P would return the commitment letter with a written acceptance and enclose a letter of credit or a cashier's check for $16k within 7 days. The commitment letter stated that the $16k was a good faith deposit and the appropriate measure of liquidated damages in case of default by P. P complied with D's terms and but mailed the commitment and check 11 days after the expiration of the term provision. P then found it could obtain a loan for less at a state bank. P requested that its monies be refunded. At trial, it was determined that D had waived the seven-day limitation and that there was a contract. P appealed; the letter was a counteroffer that was never accepted by D.

DAVIS v. JACOBY 34 P.2d 1026 (1934) CASE BRIEF

DAVIS V. JACOBY

34 P.2d 1026 (1934)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from the refusal to grant specific performance of an alleged contract to make a will.

FACTS: Davis (P) was the niece of Blanche Whitehead. There was a very close relationship between P and Blanche and her husband Rupert Whitehead. The financial condition and health of the Whiteheads encountered serious problems and Rupert asked P to come to California to care for Blanche and help Rupert salvage his business affairs. Rupert committed suicide one week after P agreed to help them with their affairs. Part of that promise was the issue of the wills of the Whiteheads and the potential inheritance that P would gain by assisting them. P did move after the suicide and took care of Blanche until her death about one month later. Upon the death of Blanche, it was discovered that two nephews would get the entire estate. P sued under the theory that Rupert had a created a contractual obligation to a make a will do that P could inherit everything and were therefore entitled to quasi-specific performance. At trial, it was shown that P's husband forfeited a substantial amount of monies in moving to California to take care of the Whiteheads. The court decided that the offer of April 12 was never accepted because that offer could only be accepted by performance and not by a promise to perform. P appealed.

AKERS V. J.B. SEDBERRY, INC. 39 Tenn.App. 633, 286 S.W.2d 617 (1955) CASE BRIEF

AKERS V. J.B. SEDBERRY, INC.

39 Tenn.App. 633, 286 S.W.2d 617 (1955)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an action for damages for a breach of an employment contract. Sedberry (D) challenged a judgment, which found in favor of Akers (P) in their suit for breach of employment contract.

FACTS: Sedberry (D) entered into a written contract with Akers (P) as Chief Engineer for a term of five years at a salary of $12k per year with an escalating percentage of the net profits over five years. Mrs. Sedberry, who owned practically all the stock of D, personally guaranteed D's performance of the contract. A similar contract was entered into by D with Whitsitt (P) but at a salary of $7.2k per year. They were to perform their duties at Jay Bee Manufacturing Company. Problems developed with Jay Bee in 1950 with its bank. After the employment contracts were made, Sedberry acquired the stock of Jay Bee and installed a new manager, Sorenson. Friction developed between Sorenson and Ps. Jay Bee also owed large amounts of money to a bank and those officials were concerned the company would fail under Sorenson and talked with Ps about that issue. Ps then flew and a had a meeting with Sedberry and offered their resignations on a ninety day notice. They were refused. That meeting continued and both Ps went back to Jay Bee, but Sorenson never attended nor knew of the meeting. The next day Mrs. Sedberry stated by telegrams that the resignations were accepted. Ps contend that Mrs. Sedberry had refused their resignations and that no new offer was open. The court awarded Ps damages and D appealed

HAWKINS V. McGEE 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929) CASE BRIEF

HAWKINS V. McGEE

84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a case in assumpsit against a surgeon McGee (D) for a breach of an alleged warranty on some surgery. D appealed the decision of the lower court issuing judgment in favor of patient, Hawkins (P) in his suit for breach of contract and warranty regarding an operation that defendant performed on P's hand.

FACTS: P wanted an operation to remove scar tissue from the palm of his hand that resulted from an accident nine years before. Before the operation was performed P and his father went to D and sought the answer to the question of how long P would be in the hospital. D replied that it would be not over four days and that in a few days after his return back home the boy could go back to work with a perfect hand. D was also alleged to state that he would make the hand a hundred percent perfect or one hundred percent good. The jury returned a verdict for P and the judge ordered remittitur and the P refused. The case was appealed.

TWEEDDALE V. TWEEDDALE 93 N.W. 440 (1903) CASE BRIEF

TWEEDDALE V. TWEEDDALE

93 N.W. 440 (1903)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an action to foreclose a mortgage. Edward (P), third-party grantee, sought relief from an entry of judgment for (D), grantor, and others in P's action brought against D and others seeking to foreclose on a mortgage agreement.

FACTS: Daniel (D) in exchange for consideration got from his mother land. D gave her a bond for $1350 to be paid if he sold the land. The bond was to be paid out $1200 to mother, $50 to his sister and $100 to his brother Edward (P). The land was sold and D settled with his mother but not with the others. P did not know of the original transaction. The mother released the bond and P sued. P did not give the mother any authority to satisfy the mortgage as to his interest therein. The trial court held that P did not have a cause of action. P appealed.

SECRETARY OF STATE OF MARYLAND V. JOSEPH H MUNSON, INC. 467 U.S. 947 (1984) CASE BRIEF

SECRETARY OF STATE OF MARYLAND V. JOSEPH H MUNSON, INC.

467 U.S. 947 (1984)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over an ordinance that regulates charitable solicitations.

FACTS: Munson (P) is a professional for profit fund-raiser. P's customers in Maryland include the Fraternal Order of Police. Section 103D of the Maryland code prohibits an organization in connection with its fund-raising activities to pay an organization such as P's more than 25% of the amount raised unless the charity can demonstrate financial necessity. P sued the Secretary of State of Maryland (D) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

SHUTTLESWORTH V. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM 394 U.S. 147 (1969) CASE BRIEF

SHUTTLESWORTH V. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM

394 U.S. 147 (1969)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction for violating an ordinance making it an offense to participate in a parade without first getting a permit.

FACTS: On April 12, 1963, 52 people, all Negroes, were led out of a church by three Negro ministers. At the end of four blocks the marchers were stopped by the Birmingham police an arrested for violating a Birmingham statute that made it illegal to parade without obtaining a permit. Shuttlesworth (D) was convicted and sentenced to 90 days at hard labor and another 48 days for failure to pay the fine and costs. The Court of Appeals reversed and the State Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

SNEPP V. UNITED STATES 444 U.S. 507 (1980) CASE BRIEF

SNEPP V. UNITED STATES

444 U.S. 507 (1980)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Snepp (D) seeks review of a judgment of punitive damages for his breach of an agreement he signed when he accepted employment with the CIA for prepublication clearance. The United States (P) seeks review of a judgment refusing a constructive trust on the profits from that book.

FACTS: Snepp (D), a former CIA agent, published a book regarding CIA activities in South Vietnam. D's employment with the CIA involved an extremely high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, D explicitly recognized that he was entering a trust relationship. The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information relating to the Agency without submitting the information for clearance. D deliberately and surreptitiously violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublication review. The Government (P) sought an injunction prohibiting future breaches of contract by D and a constructive trust on all of D's profits from the book. The district court held that D willfully, deliberately and surreptitiously breached the agreement, and granted P relief. The court also found that D deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he would seek prepublication clearance. The court determined that the book caused the U.S. irreparable harm and loss. The court of appeals upheld the injunction, but did not impose a constructive trust because D was only obligated to not divulge classified material. The book contained no classified information and D certainly had a First Amendment right to publish unclassified material. It limited recovery to nominal damages and punitive damages if P could prove tortious conduct. D filed for certiorari, and P cross-petitioned from the denial of a constructive trust.

HESS V. INDIANA 414 U.S. 105 (1973) CASE BRIEF

HESS V. INDIANA

414 U.S. 105 (1973)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction of disorderly conduct.

FACTS: During a Vietnam war protest, Hess (D) was heard to utter the word 'fuck' in a loud voice. D was arrested for disorderly conduct. D in fact said, 'We'll take the fucking street later,' or there abouts. All witnesses indicated that D did not appear to be exhorting the crowd present and that his statement did not appear to be directed at any person or group. D was convicted and appealed.

RUNYON V. McCRARY 427 U.S. 160 (1976) CASE BRIEF

RUNYON V. McCRARY

427 U.S. 160 (1976)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over whether a private school could exclude Negroes.

FACTS: McCrary and Gonzales (P) are Negro children. They filed a class action against Runyon (D) alleging that they were prevented from attending D's school because they were Negroes. P alleged violations of 42 U.S.C.A. section 1981. Another school was also named in a separate complaint by Gonzales and this was a consolidated appeal. Neither D has ever accepted Negro children for any of its programs. Ps were informed that their applications were turned down because the schools were not integrated. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

HAIG V. AGEE 453 U.S. 280 (1981) CASE BRIEF

HAIG V. AGEE

453 U.S. 280 (1981)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the President's authority to revoke a passport.

FACTS: Philip Agee, an American citizen resided in West Germany. He was employed by the CIA from 1957 to 1968 in a section that was responsible for covert intelligence. In 1974, Agee called a press conference in London to announce that he was on a campaign to fight the CIA wherever it was operating. The record before the court revealed that Agee revealed agent identities and violated his agreement and divulged classified information about CIA matters without getting prior CIA clearance. In 1979, Haig, the Secretary of State, revoked Agee's passport. Agee filed suit against the Secretary (D). The District Court held that there was no right to revoke P's passport and granted summary judgment to P. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS V. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY 440 U.S. 173 (1979) CASE BRIEF

ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS V. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

440 U.S. 173 (1979)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over an Illinois signature requirement for party ballot appearance.

FACTS: New political parties and independent candidates were required to obtain the signatures of 25,000 qualified voters in order to appear on the ballots of a state wide election in Illinois. The number of signatures required for political subdivisions in the state was 5% of the number of persons who voted in the previous election. This resulted in incongruous results; in the city of Chicago a new party would need substantially more signatures to get its candidate on the local ballot than it would need for a state election.

HILL V. STONE 421 U.S. 289 (1975) CASE BRIEF

HILL V. STONE

421 U.S. 289 (1975)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a dual box election.

FACTS: Forth Worth conducted a dual box election for a tax bond to authorize the sale of bonds to build a city library. In one box property owners voted. In the other box, all other registered voters cast their ballots. The measure would only pass if both boxes approved by majority the measure being voted upon. In this particular election 24,000 voted in the nonproperty owner box and 5,000 voted in the property owner box. The measure was approved by a majority of all voters but because there was no majority in the property owner box it was deemed not to have passed. Three of the nonproperty owners filed suit under Equal Protection.

LALLI V. LALLI 439 U.S. 259 (1978) CASE BRIEF

LALLI V. LALLI

439 U.S. 259 (1978)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal challenging the constitutional validity of a state classification disadvantaging children of unmarried parents.

FACTS: Petitioner Robert Lalli was born out of wedlock to Mario Lalli who died intestate. Mario's widow denied Robert and his sister inheritance from Mario's estate. However, before his death, Mario had held both children out to be his own; this was substantiated by affidavits of people that knew Mario. A New York law allowed intestate succession by 'illegitimate' children provided proof of paternity. A father asserts paternity by a formal declaration during the mother's pregnancy or within two years of a child's birth. The Petitioner asserted that the law discriminates against him on the basis of illegitimacy in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The Surrogate Court held against the Petitioner. The New York Court of Appeals twice affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.

KEYES V. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER COLO. 413 U.S. 189 (1973) CASE BRIEF

KEYES V. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER COLO.

413 U.S. 189 (1973)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is an appeal of a court order that denied relief in a school desegregation case.

FACTS: A district court ordered the desegregation of a Denver school district, since a certain area had been intentionally segregated. The school board (D) had gerrymandered the districts to deliberately segregate schools. Keyes (P) wanted system-wide relief, but the court did not order system-wide desegregation since it did not find intentional segregation in other areas. The court of appeals affirmed.

CRAWFORD V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 458 U.S. 527 (1982) CASE BRIEF

CRAWFORD V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

458 U.S. 527 (1982)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over Proposition I.

FACTS: The California Supreme Court ruled that state school boards bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in public schools whether the segregation was de facto or de jure in origin. That was a higher standard than imposed under federal decisions. Proposition I was passed in California that gave courts the power to order busing only if a federal court would do so to remedy the violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The California Court of Appeals upheld the Proposition I.

WASHINGTON v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 458 U.S. 457 (1982) CASE BRIEF

WASHINGTON V. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1

458 U.S. 457 (1982)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Seattle (P) challenged a statewide initiative that terminated mandatory busing under Equal Protection and the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington (D) appealed a decision of the District Court which held the initiative unconstitutional which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

FACTS: Because segregated housing patterns in Seattle have created racially imbalanced schools, P historically has taken steps to alleviate the isolation of minority students; since 1963, it has permitted students to transfer from their neighborhood schools to help cure the District's racial imbalance. Eventually P enacted a resolution defining 'racial imbalance' as 'the situation that exists when the combined minority student enrollment in a school exceeds the district wide combined average by 20 percentage points, provided that the single minority enrollment . . . of no school will exceed 50 percent of the student body.' P implemented a 'magnet' program, designed to alleviate racial isolation by enhancing educational offerings at certain schools, thereby encouraging voluntary student transfers. P concluded that mandatory reassignment of students was necessary if racial isolation in its schools was to be eliminated. P enacted the so-called 'Seattle Plan' for desegregation. The plan makes extensive use of busing and mandatory reassignments, desegregates elementary schools by 'pairing' and 'trading' predominantly minority with predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing student assignments on attendance zones rather than on race. The implementation was effective. The District Court found that the Seattle Plan 'has substantially reduced the number of racially imbalanced schools in the district and has substantially reduced the percentage of minority students in those schools which remain racially imbalanced.' The counterrevolution was swift and immediate. A proposal, known as Initiative 350, provided that 'no school board . . . shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence . . . and which offers the course of study pursued by such student . . . .' Initiative 350 was placed on the Washington ballot for the November 1978 general election. The initiative was directed solely at desegregative busing in general, and at the Seattle Plan in particular. Initiative 350 passed by a substantial margin, drawing almost 66% of the vote statewide. P initiated this suit against the State (D) in District Court challenging the constitutionality of Initiative 350 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held the statute to be unconstitutional, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

EVANS V. ABNEY 396 U.S. 435 (1970) CASE BRIEF

EVANS V. ABNEY

396 U.S. 435 (1970)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the disposition of land.

FACTS: Senator Bacon conveyed property to the city of Macon, Georgia to use for the creation of a public park for the exclusive enjoyment of white people. It was eventually determined that the park could not operate that way in Evans v Newton 382 U.S. 296 (1966). The issue is now one of what happens to the park; does it revert back to the heirs of the Senator or does the termination of the trust violate Negro citizens' rights to equal protection and due process. The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that the park reverts back to the heirs and that cy pres does not apply.

ISSUE:

RULE OF LAW:

HOLDING AND DECISION:

LEGAL ANALYSIS:

Get free access to the entire content for Mac, PC or Online

for 2-3 days and free samples of all kinds of products.

https://bsmsphd.com

© 2007-2016 Abn Study Partner

VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE V. BORAAS 416 U.S. 1 (1974) CASE BRIEF

VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE V. BORAAS

416 U.S. 1 (1974)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a judgment invalidating a zoning ordinance.

FACTS: The Belle Terre (D) restricted land use to single family dwellings. D was a small village of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. D defined a family as one or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants; a number of persons but not exceeding two living and cooking together as a single house-keeping unit though not related by blood adoption or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family. Dickman (P) was an owner of a house in the village. P leased it to Truman and later Borass (P1) became a co lessee. Anne Parish moved into the house along with three others. P1 and the five other persons were in violation of the ordinance as they were unrelated to each other and none were married to each other. They were students at the nearby University at Stoney Brook. D served Ps with an 'Order to Remedy Violations.' Ps brought an action for an injunction, claiming that the ordinance was unconstitutional in that the ordinance violated their right to free association and privacy under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court ruled that the ordinance was constitutional and the Court of Appeals reversed. D appealed.

HUTCHINSON V. PROXMIRE 443 U.S. 111 (1979) CASE BRIEF

HUTCHINSON V. PROXMIRE

443 U.S. 111 (1979)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over immunity.

FACTS: Proxmire (D) and his assistant decided to award Hutchinson (P) the 'Golden Fleece Award.' P sued D for defamation. Before the award was published and sent to 275 members of the news media worldwide, D's aid called P and P protested the award and the inaccurate and incomplete summary of his research. D also referred to his characterization of P's monkey research in a newsletter sent to 100,000 other people on a mailing list including constituents in Wisconsin. D referred to the research on news shows. P filed suit in federal court for the defamation and interference in contractual relationships with the agencies that had sponsored P's work. The Court of Appeals held that the Speech or Debate Clauses protected the statements made in the press release and in the newsletter but the follow up calls and statements made on television and radio were not so protected. The Court of Appeals then determined that those follow up comments were protected by the First Amendment. P appealed.

UNITED STATES V. HELSTOSKI 442 U.S. 477 (1979) CASE BRIEF

UNITED STATES V. HELSTOSKI

442 U.S. 477 (1979)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over Congressional immunity.

FACTS: Helstoski (D) was a member of the House of Representatives. D came under investigation for corruption including the charge that aliens had paid D money to introduce private bills which would suspend application of the immigration laws and allow them to stay in the country. D appeared before the grand jury eight times and discussed the matters and produced files. On the ninth appearance, D asserted the privilege of Speech or Debate Clause. D was indicted for various criminal acts, The District court held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not require dismissal but that the Government would not be allowed to offer evidence of the actual performance of any legislative acts. The government filed an appeal.

ROGERS V. BELLEI 401 U.S. 815 (1971) CASE BRIEF

ROGERS V. BELLEI

401 U.S. 815 (1971)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the Immigration Act of 1952.

FACTS: The Act stated that if a person born abroad of parents, one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the U.S., who has met specified conditions of residence in this country shall lose that citizenship unless after age 14 and before age 28, that person comes to the U.S. and is physically present here continuously for at least five years. Bellei (P) was born in Italy in 1939. He is now 31. P's mother was a U.S. citizen. His father was Italian. P has come to the U.S. five different times with each visit being less than five months each time. P was warned of Section 301(b) in writing when he was in this country in 1963 and again in November when he was in Italy. Sometime after February 11, 1964 he was advised by the American Embassy that he had lost his citizenship.

AFROYIM V. RUSK 387 U.S. 253 (1967) CASE BRIEF

AFROYIM V. RUSK

387 U.S. 253 (1967)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the loss of citizenship.

FACTS: Afroyim (P) was born in Poland in 1893 and immigrated to the U.S. in 1912. P became a nationalized citizen in 1926. In 1950 he went to Israel and voluntarily voted in an election there for the Israeli Knesset. In 1960 when he reapplied for a U.S. Passport the Department of State refused to grant him one on the sole ground that he had lost his American Citizenship by voting in the election of a foreign state (Section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940). P sued in a declaratory action for violation of Due Process under the Fifth Amendment and under the Fourteenth Amendment; the only way to lose citizenship is by voluntary renunciation. The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected these claims.

FIALLO V. BELL 430 U.S. 787 (1977) CASE BRIEF

FIALLO V. BELL

430 U.S. 787 (1977)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.

FACTS: The Act gave special preference to aliens who qualify as children or parents of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. Appellants (A) are three sets of unwed natural fathers and their illegitimate offspring who sought, either as an alien father or an alien child, a special immigration preference by virtue of a relationship to a citizen or resident alien child or parent. The Act excluded illegitimates from that special status. A claimed that this was unconstitutional under the First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments; they were denied equal protection, due process of law by the conclusive presumption of the absence of a strong psychological and economic tie between the fathers and their illegitimate offspring and strongly interfered with their rights of association.

GALVAN V. PRESS 347 U.S. 522 (1954) CASE BRIEF

GALVAN V. PRESS

347 U.S. 522 (1954)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the deportation of an alien for being a member of the Communist party.

FACTS: Petitioner (P) was an alien of Mexican birth. He lived in the U.S. since 1918. In the course of questioning by INS in March 1948, P indicated that he had been a member of the communist party from 1944 to 1946. In December 1950, a de novo hearing was held and P was ordered deported under the Internal Security Act of 1950. A writ of habeas corpus was denied and that was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. P appealed.

UNITED STATES V. PINK 315 U.S. 203 (1942) CASE BRIEF

UNITED STATES V. PINK

315 U.S. 203 (1942)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an action to recover the assets of the New York branch of the First Russian Insurance Co.

FACTS: The First Russian Insurance Co. established a branch in New York in 1907. In 1918 and 1919 the Russian Government nationalized all insurance companies, discharged and cancelled all debts and the rights of shareholders in such companies. The New York Branch continued to do business until 1925. At that time Respondent, pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court of New York took possession of its assets. All claims were settled and a balance of more than $1,000,000 was left over. The Court of Appeals directed that the claims of foreign creditors be paid and then to pay any surplus remaining to a quorum of the board of directors of the company. A stay was granted and in the interim in 1933 the U.S. recognized the USSR and as an incidence to that recognition accepted an assignment of certain claims (this was known as the Litvinov Assignment). The New York court of appeals held that the Russian decrees had no extraterritorial effect.

WHITNEY V. ROBERTSON 124 U.S. 190 (1888) CASE BRIEF

WHITNEY V. ROBERTSON

124 U.S. 190 (1888)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a duty imposed in sugars imported from San Domingo.

FACTS: P are merchants doing business in the City of New York. They imported sugars from San Domingo. Ps claimed that because of a treaty with San Domingo the goods should be exempt from duty. D, who was the collector at the port, refused to allow this claim. D treated the goods as dutiable articles under the acts of Congress and exacted a duty on them of $21,936. Ps sued in court.

THE DANIEL BALL 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1871) CASE BRIEF

THE DANIEL BALL

77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1871)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the license of a steamer.

FACTS: The Daniel Ball was a steamer only conducting its business between Grand Rapids and Grand Haven; all within the state of Michigan. A Congressional Act of 1838 made it unlawful to operate steam ships on the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable waters of the United States without a license. The Daniel Ball did not have a license under U.S. law and was fined $500. The Government sued to recover that fine. The United States (P) sued and the owners asserted that the ship was not subject to the license requirement because the Grand River was not a navigable water and the ship did not engage in interstate commerce. The District Court dismissed the case but the Circuit Court reversed. The Supreme Court granted review.