Law School Case Briefs: romlaw

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LAWRENCE V. ASHBA, 59 N.E.2d 568 (1945) CASE BRIEF

LAWRENCE V. ASHBA

59 N.E.2d 568 (1945)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an action in specific performance and for an accounting, for the setting aside of a real estate conveyance and for a constructive trust.

FACTS: Mrs. Lawrence's first husband died in 1905 and in 1907 she married William T. Lawrence who never had any children. In 1937 the married couple held some property by the entireties which had been largely acquired through the thrift and financial resources of Mrs. Lawrence. On that day in 1937 the parties made mutual wills that gave their estates to each other and then to Mrs. Lawrence's three children. Eventually the properties were disposed of but new properties were acquired. Mrs. Lawrence died in 1942. Those properties were held in entireties. After her death, William emptied their safe deposit box. The will was probated on October 13, 1942. William then married again on September 20, 1942 and eight days later vested title in the real estate to his new wife, Iva. Williams openly stating that this was so Mrs. Lawrence's children would not get anything. There was no evidence of consideration for the conveyances to Iva.

ISSUE:

RULE OF LAW:

HOLDING AND DECISION:

LEGAL ANALYSIS:

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CUMMINGS V. SHERMAN, 132 P.2d 998 (1943) CASE BRIEF

CUMMINGS V. SHERMAN

132 P.2d 998 (1943)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the enforcement of mutual wills.

FACTS: Homer and Phoebe executed mutual wills. Homer died later that year and his will was admitted to probate and it gave Phoebe full right of disposition. Phoebe changed her will before her death and that will was probated. The new will made no provisions for Homer's relatives who sought and were awarded half of Phoebe's estate based on the contract to make the mutual wills. Phoebe's relatives appealed.

IN RE KAUFMAN'S ESTATE, 155 P.2d 831 (1945) CASE BRIEF

IN RE KAUFMAN'S ESTATE

155 P.2d 831 (1945)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over wills admitted to probate.

FACTS: A 1940 will was executed in New York. Later that will was expressly revoked and another was executed in California on April 30, 1941. Both wills named identical persons for identical cash bequests and a church as residual legatee. The testator died on May 2, 1941. The 1941 will was admitted to probate but the bequest to the church was declared null and void as statutes prohibited charitable bequests executed within 30 days of death. The church filed this petition to have the 1940 will probated. The trial court refused. This appeal resulted.

KELLY V. DONALDSON, 456 So.2d 30 (Ala. 1984) CASE BRIEF

KELLY V. DONALDSON

456 So.2d 30 (Ala. 1984)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over an alleged revocation.

FACTS: A will was offered for probate and it was contested under an alleged revocation. The proponent of the will was the sole beneficiary of the will and the sole evidence in support of her position was her testimony that the decedent executed the lawyer drawn will in duplicate originals, retained one copy, and gave the other to the proponent. After the decedent's death the retained copy could not be found. The jury gave the verdict to the proponent. The appeal resulted.

THOMPSON V. ROYALL, 163 Va. 492, 175 S.E. 748 (1934), CASE BRIEF

THOMPSON V. ROYALL

163 Va. 492, 175 S.E. 748 (1934)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a will contest. Appeal from order allowing probate. Thompson (P), heirs at law, appealed from a judgment, which sustained the trial court verdict probating the will of the testator in favor of Royall (D), beneficiaries.

FACTS: Testatrix executed a will and codicil. Thereafter, she wished to revoke both instruments, and instructed her attorney to destroy them. Her attorney convinced her not to have them destroyed, and to keep them as memoranda in case she decided to have a new will drafted. Notes to this effect were handwritten by testatrix's attorney on separate pieces of paper, signed by testatrix, and physically attached to the will and codicil. After testatrix's death, some of the beneficiaries of the will and codicil (D) attempted to have them probated. A jury found that the instruments were valid, and the court below ordered them to be admitted to probate. Testatrix's heirs (P) appeal.

UNION PLANTERS NATIONAL BANK V. INMAN, 588 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn.App. 1979) CASE BRIEF

UNION PLANTERS NATIONAL BANK V. INMAN

588 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn.App. 1979)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a will contest.

FACTS: A 1965 will left property outright. The 1971 will left the property in trust. The 1971 will was contested by two of the testator's children who alleged that the decedent's lawyer falsely led the decedent to believe that one son was heavily in debt and another had large exposures to real estate ventures. The children claimed the lawyer encouraged the decedent to include the trust arrangements to protect his children from creditors. The allegations of fraud and undue influence were not supported but there was conflicting evidence as to the son's financial condition and the trial judge found no genuine issue of material facts and grants the proponent's motion for summary judgment. This appeal resulted.

ESTATE OF KREMLICK, 331 N.W.2d 228 (1983) CASE BRIEF

ESTATE OF KREMLICK

331 N.W.2d 228 (1983)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the residue of an estate.

FACTS: Testator left his residue to the Michigan Cancer Society. The court of appeals upheld that Society's claim to the devise finding no ambiguity. The American Cancer Society appealed.

KNUPP V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 578 A.2d 702 (D.C.App. 1990) CASE BRIEF

KNUPP V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

578 A.2d 702 (D.C.App. 1990)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a mistake in a will.

FACTS: A testator gave instructions to his attorney to draft a will with a residual beneficiary. That attorney screwed up and failed to name the residual beneficiary as he was instructed. The two prior wills drafted by the same attorney for the testator named a personal friend Richard Knupp (P) as the residual beneficiary. The attorney submitted an affidavit admitting that he had mistakenly failed to designate the residual beneficiary as he had been instructed. The trial judge found the will was ambiguous on its face and heard extrinsic evidence. However, the judge came to his senses and excluded that evidence. This appeal resulted.

MATTER OF SNIDE, 418 N.E.2d 656 (1981) CASE BRIEF

MATTER OF SNIDE

418 N.E.2d 656 (1981)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the admissibility of a will to probate. Appeal by Rose Snide, wife, from an order which reversed a decree admitting decedent's will to probate.

FACTS: Harvey and his wife Rose each intended to execute mutual wills at a common execution ceremony. Each executed by mistake the will intended for the other. Harvey is survived by Rose and three children. Two of the elder children have executed waivers and have consented to admission. The minor child is represented by a guardian ad litem who refused to make such a concession. The argument is that Harvey lacked the required testamentary intent because he never intended to execute the document he actually signed.

SIEGLEY V. SIMPSON, 131 P. 479 (1913) CASE BRIEF

SIEGLEY V. SIMPSON

131 P. 479 (1913)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the identity of a legatee in a will.

FACTS: Henry's will left $6,000 to his good friend Richard H. Simpson. The legacy was claimed by Richard H. Simpson and Hamilton Ross Simpson. The lower court held for Hamilton Ross and Richard H. has appealed arguing that parol evidence was not admissible to oppose his claim.

BRECKHEIMER V. KRAFT, 273 N.E.2d 468 (1971) CASE BRIEF

BRECKHEIMER V. KRAFT

273 N.E.2d 468 (1971)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a misnomer in a will.

FACTS: Clara's will was executed nine days before her death. She gave her residuary estate to her nephew Raymond and his wife Mabel Schneikert. At the time the will was executed, Raymond's wife was Evelyn and his former wife was named Mabel Reihs and had remarried. The relatives of Clara claimed the residue on the ground that the residuary bequest was invalid for the misnomer. Raymond and his wife claimed the residue and Mabel also got into the act by claiming half of the residue. The trial court ruled for the current husband and wife combination. This appeal resulted.

CLARK V. GREENHALGE, 411 Mass. 410, 582 N.E.2d 949 (1991) CASE BRIEF

CLARK V. GREENHALGE

411 Mass. 410, 582 N.E.2d 949 (1991)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an action to compel delivery of a bequest under a will. Appealed. This was an appeal of an order that affirmed a probate judge's decision awarding a painting to Clark (P) in P's action seeking to compel Greenhalge (D) to deliver the painting to her following the probate of a testatrix's will.

FACTS: Testatrix executed a will in 1977 naming Greenhalge (D) as both her principal beneficiary and the executor of her estate. In 1980, she executed two codicils to the will. Under the will, D was to receive all of testatrix's personal property except for those items which were otherwise disposed of in a memorandum which was mentioned in the will, and which the will recited was known to D. D had helped testatrix draft such a memorandum in 1972. Testatrix also kept a notebook, dated 1979, which listed dispositions of personal property: she made entries in this notebook periodically. In the notebook, testatrix indicated that a painting hanging in her house was to be given to her neighbor, Clark (P). This was not indicated in the memorandum which D helped her draft. After testatrix's death, D received her will, the memorandum, and the notebook, and distributed the property in accordance with the. However, he refused to give the painting to P. At trial, the judge found that the 1979 notebook was a 'memorandum' within the meaning of the will; the notebook was in existence at the time the codicils were executed; and that the codicils ratified the portion of the 1977 will referring to the memorandum.

MAGINN'S ESTATE, 127 A. 79 (1924) CASE BRIEF

MAGINN'S ESTATE

127 A. 79 (1924)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a rejection of three typewritten pages of seven as a will.

FACTS: A will was petitioned for probate. It consisted of seven loose leaf pages with no relation from one page to the next. Any single page could be substituted into or out of the alleged will with no change in character of the document. There was no relation or recital between the pages and they contained no words of testamentary character. The court ruled that they were not a will. Then the petitioner's appealed the creation of a will from three of the pages.

MAGINN'S ESTATE, 122 A. 264 (1923) CASE BRIEF

MAGINN'S ESTATE

122 A. 264 (1923)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the validity of will.

IN RE ESTATE OF KAMESAR, 259 N.W.2d 733 (1977) CASE BRIEF

IN RE ESTATE OF KAMESAR

259 N.W.2d 733 (1977)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a will contest for undue influence.

FACTS: Kamesar executed a will in 1971 that incorporate a prenuptial agreement with his second wife and gave his grandchild $5,000 and left the rest of his estate to Bernice, one of two daughters stating that his other two children had been provided for in his life. This was contested by Kamesar's son and other daughter for undue influence. The trial court admitted the will to probate. Since 1968, Bernice managed her father's affairs and held a power of attorney. There were records of substantial gifts to the other son and daughter but none to Bernice or her children but in 1973 Bernice and her children each got $3,000 each per year from Kamesar. All except his son testified that Kamesar was of sound mind and body when he married his second wife in 1971. A doctor testified that Kamesar had been in ill health for a number of years and lacked the ability to make decisions when he became hospitalized in 1973. The will was signed with Bernice and his second wife along with the long time attorney of Kamesar present. The attorney questioned Kamesar about the dispositions and that attorney believed that he was competent at the time the will was signed. His wife testified that later, when asked about cutting out his two other children, Kamesar would not remember doing that act.

IN RE CARSON'S ESTATE, 184 Cal. 437 (1920) CASE BRIEF

IN RE CARSON'S ESTATE

184 Cal. 437 (1920)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an action to have probate revoked based on fraud.

FACTS: Alpha Carson left a number of bequests to relatives and her residuary estate to her husband. Within the statutory period following probate, her heirs petitioned to have probate revoked based on fraud. The facts indicated that testatrix and her husband had gone through a marriage ceremony a year before her death. Testatrix made her will believing that she was the wife of Gamble Carson. But it is alleged that Gamble was already married to another woman who was still living when he married Alpha. Carson was aware of his incapacity to marry but concealed this from the testatrix. The will was admitted to probate. The lower court ruled a nonsuit and this appeal resulted.

IN RE HONIGMAN, 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676, 203 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1960) CASE BRIEF

IN RE HONIGMAN

8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676, 203 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1960)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from the denying of a will to probate.

FACTS: Honigman was happily married to his wife for forty years. After a number of operations and an operation for a prostatectomy and a cancer operation he began to express that his belief that his wife was unfaithful to him. Honigman accused her of all sorts of acts, visited a psychiatrist, and several times mentioned that he was sick in the head. Honigman died but one month before modified his will; he left a small estate to his wife and the remainder to his relatives. His attorney stated that the decision to make a new will just before his death was based on the belief of his wife's infidelity, her large independent estate, and the need of his other relatives. Mrs. Honigman (P) alleged that, he was operating under an insane delusion and lacked the mental capacity to make a will. A jury found that he lacked mental capacity to make a will with respect to P even though he was sane in all other respects.

MATTER OF KUMSTAR , 487 N.E.2d 271 (1985) CASE BRIEF

MATTER OF KUMSTAR

487 N.E.2d 271 (1985)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the probate of a will. It was an appeal from a finding of incapacity.

FACTS: Probate of will was denied based on the jury finding incompetence and undue influence. Evidence was presented from medical testimony to prove that Kumstar was competent. The only evidence to claim that Kumstar was incompetent was from the face of the will which bequeathed property to a brother who had been deceased for some time and that Kumstar had omitted small bequests as previously promised from the will. The jury found incompetence. The proponent appealed. The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to raise the issue of incompetence and undue influence. The proponent appealed again.

SUCCESSIONS OF EDDY, 664 So.2d 853 (La. App. 1995) CASE BRIEF

SUCCESSIONS OF EDDY

664 So.2d 853 (La. App. 1995)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a denial to probate a will.

FACTS: Eddy died on January 14, 1994 and a will dated February 23, 1993 was presented for probate by the named executrix. The will was ordered filed and executed. Richard Tison, nephew of the deceased filed a petition to annul the probated will alleging that it did not meet the formal requirements for a statutory will. The will under attack was prepared on an EZ Legal Form which was apparently purchased at a store. The attestation clause and places for all the signatures were on the back of the will. The will was declared invalid because the front side of the single sheet did not bear the signature of the testatrix. The named executrix of the invalidated will appealed.

ESTATE OF REED, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983) CASE BRIEF

ESTATE OF REED

672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a taped recorded statement. It was an appeal in a probate proceeding.

FACTS: A taped recorded statement was requested to be admitted into probate as a will. Reed made a tape recorded statement. The position was that the recorded statement was a writing conforming to the holographic will statute. The argument was that the recording was a writing done by voice print vs. one done by hand print. The trial court refused and this appeal resulted.