PEOPLE V. CARUSO 159 N.E. 390 (1927) CASE BRIEF

PEOPLE V. CARUSO
159 N.E. 390 (1927)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a first degree murder conviction.
FACTS: Caruso (D) had a boy who became ill with diphtheria. The boy was treated by Dr. Pendola and it was diagnosed that the boy had diphtheria. D was told to buy some medicine. D claims the pharmacist told him that the dosage was too high for a child and that D had told the Dr. what the pharmacist said. The Dr. administered the medicine. D got another prescription with instructions for its usage. The Dr. said he would return the next day. The boy was in bad shape and D stayed with him hoping for the doctor to return. At 10 am he sent for an ambulance from the drug store but the child died. The Dr. arrived after the death and D told him that the boy had been dead for some time. D testified at trial that the doctor laughed at the news and then D lost his head and attacked the Dr. in anger, took a knife, stabbed him twice in the throat and killed him. D had accused the Dr. of killing the boy by an overdose. Testimony at trial indicated that the dosage given was correct. The issue at trial was whether there was premeditation and deliberation on the part of D prior to the killing. D was convicted and appealed.

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HOLMES V. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS 2 All E.R. 124 (1946) CASE BRIEF

HOLMES V. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
2 All E.R. 124 (1946)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction for murder.
FACTS: Holmes (D) killed his wife in the kitchen of the house where they lived. The day before the killing he had telegraphed an ex-lover and told her to expect him either that Sunday or Monday. D claimed that there was a quarrel between him and his wife and that his wife had admitted that she had been untrue to him and that she knew of his indiscretions. D then claimed he lost his temper and picked up a hammer and struck her on the head. She lay there and suffered from the wound and D then strangled her. D testified at trial that when he strangled her, he intended to kill her. The trial judge refused an instruction for voluntary manslaughter in that the statement by the wife that she was unfaithful to D was not enough for adequate provocation. Also, there was no corroboration to support D's statement that his wife admitted to her unfaithfulness. D was convicted of murder and appealed.

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STATE V. OXBORROW 723 P.2d 1123 (1986) CASE BRIEF

STATE V. OXBORROW
723 P.2d 1123 (1986)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a sentence imposed for a pyramid scheme.
FACTS: Oxborrow (D) initiated a pyramid scheme that raked in over $58 million dollars with the promise of returns of up to 2% per week on commodity investments. Eventually the scheme fell apart and over $13 million was unaccounted for and over 500 investors lost everything they put into the scheme. D led the high life during these episodes and bilked his customers by displaying large pictures of Jesus and other Christian items on prominent display throughout his home and office. D also purchased two Rolls Royce cars, a Cadillac limo, several airplanes, and an oceanside resort cabin, decorated his office and home with fine leather furniture, expensive antiques, and imported Chinese rugs. A cease and desist order was issued but D ignored that and took another $1 million. D hired an attorney and pled guilty to theft and willful violation of the cease and desist order. Under SRA, the crimes carried a 90-day and 12 months limit and the statutory maximum of 10 years in each case. D had no prior criminal record. The Prosecutor recommended concurrent 10 year and 5-year sentences. The trial judge ordered consecutive 10 and 5-year sentences. D appealed.

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UNITED STATES V. ELY 719 F.2d 902 (7th Cir.1983) CASE BRIEF

UNITED STATES V. ELY
719 F.2d 902 (7th Cir.1983)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Ely (D) challenged his convictions for possession of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. 841 and failure to appear in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. 3150 in a United States District Court. This was an appeal based on denial of counsel of choice.
FACTS: Ely (D) was indicted along with two other men for distributing and conspiring to distribute cocaine. D was the middleman with Dawson, his supplier, and Griswold, a dealer to whom D supplied. Griswold and Dawson pled guilty and were sentenced to 10 and 15 years respectively. Dawson moved for a reduction in sentence, that motion was denied, and he appealed. D failed to appear in court with the others and became a fugitive. They were eventually caught and D eventually received a 30-year sentence while the other two got 10 and 15 years. Ely (D) was arraigned on a criminal matter and requested court appointed counsel. The court appointed Brady. Ely stated, 'Mr. Bartley had represented business of mine at one time and I have -- I feel a more closer relationship with Mr. Bartley in understanding what is before me. . . .' Although Bartley was willing to accept the appointment and had represented other indigent criminal defendants before the district judge, the judge refused to appoint him to represent Ely: 'the Court appoints an attorney for you under the program that this Court has of attorneys on its list and in some relative degree of sequence and frequency. . . . I know that Mr. Brady is [a] thoroughly competent and experienced attorney in this Court. I don't have anything different to say about Mr. Bartley, but we cannot start the practice of allowing defendants to select attorneys to be appointed.' The trial judge refused. D appealed. D contends the judge violated his Sixth Amendment rights by denying him his counsel of choice.

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PEOPLE V. POINTER 151 Cal.App.3d 1128 (1984) CASE BRIEF

PEOPLE V. POINTER
151 Cal.App.3d 1128 (1984)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a condition of probation and an appeal from a conviction of child endangerment. Pointer (D) sought review of a judgment, which convicted her of felony of child endangerment in violation of Cal. Penal Code 273a (1), found her to be in violation of a custody decree, and ordered that D was prohibited from conceiving a child as a condition of her probation.
FACTS: Pointer (D) was devoted to a macrobiotic diet. She was the mother of two children, 2 and 4, and imposed her macrobiotic diet on them. She was given repeated advice by her physician that such a diet was not appropriate and was in fact unhealthy for young children. The father of the children sought assistance from CPS and the children were examined and found to be severely undernourished. Eventually emergency procedures were initiated to save the life of one of the children. Upon discharge, the child was placed in foster care. D took the child and fled to Puerto Rico. D was located by the FBI and arrested. D was found guilty of violations of the penal code sections 273a and 278.5 and sentenced to five years probation on the condition that she serve one year in county jail, participate in appropriate counseling, and not be informed of her child's whereabouts and have no unsupervised visits, have no custody of any children including her own, and she not conceive during the probationary period. D challenges this last condition as an unconstitutional restriction of her fundamental rights to privacy and to procreate.

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SCREWS V. UNITED STATES 325 U.S. 91 (1945) CASE BRIEF

SCREWS V. UNITED STATES
325 U.S. 91 (1945)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a case of police brutality.
FACTS: Screws (D) was sheriff of Baker County, Georgia. A young Negro named Hall was arrested late at night for stealing a tire. The arrest was done by D and two other officers. Hall was handcuffed and taken to the courthouse. When Hall left the car, the officers present stated that he allegedly reached for a gun and then proceeded to beat him senseless (while still handcuffed). Hall was dragged to the jail and an ambulance was called. Hall died within the hour. There was evidence that D had a grudge against Hall and had threatened to get him. Ds were charged with violation of Section 20 of the Criminal Code for their acting under color of law and willfully causing Hall to be deprived of his rights privileges and immunities secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. A jury trial was held and Ds were found guilty. The court of appeals affirmed.

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STATE V. ANONYMOUS 389 A.2d 1270 (1978) CASE BRIEF

STATE V. ANONYMOUS
389 A.2d 1270 (1978)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction of disorderly conduct and harassment.
FACTS: On the day of the alleged offenses the complaining witness and her friend were traveling to work when they passed Anonymous (D) in another car. When the car in which the complainant was riding turned into the parking lot of the restaurant where she worked, D's car, which had been following, drove up close to the complainant, who had by then emerged from her car, and D shouted from the car window that the complainant was a 'tramp,' that her mother was a whore and had gone to bed with D's husband, and that the D was 'going to get' the complainant this time. While D was making these insulting remarks, the complainant and her companion walked toward the restaurant and entered. This incident was the basis for the disorderly conduct charge. D then later that day telephoned complainant at her work and repeated the same charges. D was charged with disorderly conduct and harassment. D was convicted. D appealed.

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CITY OF MILWAUKEE V. NELSON 439 N.W.2d 562 (1989) CASE BRIEF

CITY OF MILWAUKEE V. NELSON
439 N.W.2d 562 (1989)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a review of an unpublished court of appeals' decision which reversed an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County. The circuit court had ruled that Milwaukee City Ordinance 106-31(1)(a), a loitering ordinance, was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. It also found the ordinance and sec. 800.02(6), Stats. 1987-88 which permits arrest for ordinance violations, contravened the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and art. I, sec. 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution. The court of appeals reversed these determinations.
FACTS: Nelson (D) was arrested for violating a loitering ordinance for the city of Milwaukee. The ordinance was substantially identical to the Model Penal Code section 250.6. D was noticed by police in a high crime area for drug trafficking, loitering, and public drinking. No loitering signs were posted. D was noticed shaking hands with pedestrians and auto passengers. At no time did the officers observe any money or drugs changing hands and they did not know D nor did they have any information that he was a suspect in any way. The officers approached and D fled the scene to a nearby bar. They left and the activity resumed once again. The officers approached again and D quickly entered the tavern. The officers followed and asked D to account for his activities outside the tavern. D replied that he was doing nothing. D was arrested for loitering and patted down. D was placed in a police van and taken to the police station. A handgun was discovered in the police van and D admitted it was his and that it was stolen. D was charged with carrying a concealed weapon and theft. D pled guilty to violating the loitering ordinance. D's counsel then filed suppression against the handgun based on an illegal arrest. D was convicted and appealed.

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PAPACHRISTOU V. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE 405 U.S. 156 (1972) CASE BRIEF

PAPACHRISTOU V. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE
405 U.S. 156 (1972)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a case about a conviction for vagrancy. This case involves eight defendants who were convicted in a Florida municipal court of violating a Jacksonville, Florida, vagrancy ordinance.
FACTS: At issue are five consolidated cases. Margaret Papachristou, Betty Calloway, Eugene Eddie Melton, and Leonard Johnson were all arrested early on a Sunday morning, and charged with vagrancy - 'prowling by auto.' Jimmy Lee Smith and Milton Henry were charged with vagrancy - 'vagabonds.' Henry Edward Heath and a codefendant were arrested for vagrancy - 'loitering' and 'common thief.' Thomas Owen Campbell was charged with vagrancy - 'common thief.' Hugh Brown was charged with vagrancy - 'disorderly loitering on street' and 'disorderly conduct - resisting arrest with violence.' Papachristou and Calloway are white females. Melton and Johnson are black males. Papachristou was enrolled in a job-training program sponsored by the State Employment Service at Florida Junior College in Jacksonville. Calloway was a typing and shorthand teacher at a state mental institution located near Jacksonville. She was the owner of the automobile in which the four defendants were arrested. Melton was a Vietnam war veteran who had been released from the Navy after nine months in a veterans' hospital. On the date of his arrest he was a part-time computer helper while attending college as a full-time student in Jacksonville. Johnson was a tow-motor operator in a grocery chain warehouse and was a lifelong resident of Jacksonville. All four of them were riding in Calloway's car on the main thoroughfare in Jacksonville. They had eaten and were on their way to a nightclub. The arresting officers denied that the racial mixture in the car played any part in the decision to make the arrest. The arrest, they said, was made because the defendants had stopped near a used-car lot which had been broken into several times. There was, however, no evidence of any breaking and entering on the night in question. They were charged with 'prowling by auto' none had been previously arrested except Papachristou who had once been convicted of a municipal offense. Jimmy Lee Smith and Milton Henry (who is not a petitioner) were arrested between 9 and 10 a. m. on a weekday in downtown Jacksonville, while waiting for a friend who was to lend them a car so they could apply for a job at a produce company. Smith was a part-time produce worker and part-time organizer for a Negro political group. He had a common-law wife and three children supported by him and his wife. He had been arrested several times but convicted only once. Smith's companion, Henry, was an 18-year-old high school student with no previous record of arrest. Smith had no jacket, so they went briefly into a dry cleaning shop to wait, but left when requested to do so. They thereafter walked back and forth two or three times over a two-block stretch looking for their friend. The store owners, who apparently were wary of Smith and his companion, summoned two police officers who searched the men and found neither had a weapon. But they were arrested because the officers said they had no identification and because the officers did not believe their story. Heath and a codefendant were arrested for 'loitering' and for 'common thief.' Both were residents of Jacksonville, Heath having lived there all his life and being employed at an automobile body shop. Heath had previously been arrested but his codefendant had no arrest record. Heath and his companion were arrested when they drove up to a residence shared by Heath's girlfriend and some other girls. Some police officers were already there in the process of arresting another man. When Heath and his companion started backing out of the driveway, the officers signaled to them to stop and asked them to get out of the car, which they did. Thereupon they and the automobile were searched. No contraband or incriminating evidence was found, but they were both arrested, Heath being charged with being a 'common thief' because he was reputed to be a thief. The codefendant was charged with 'loitering' because he was standing in the driveway, an act which the officers admitted was done only at their command. Campbell was arrested as he reached his home very early one morning and was charged with 'common thief.' He was stopped by officers because he was traveling at a high rate of speed, yet no speeding charge was placed against him. Brown was arrested when he was observed leaving a downtown Jacksonville hotel by a police officer seated in a cruiser. The police testified he was reputed to be a thief, narcotics pusher, and generally opprobrious character. The officer called Brown over to the car, intending at that time to arrest him unless he had a good explanation for being on the street. Brown walked over to the police cruiser, as commanded, and the officer began to search him, apparently preparatory to placing him in the car. In the process of the search he came on two small packets which were later found to contain heroin. When the officer touched the pocket where the packets were, Brown began to resist. He was charged with 'disorderly loitering on street' and 'disorderly conduct - resisting arrest with violence.' Ds challenged the vagrancy ordinance because it was unconstitutionally vague.

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STATE V. COATES 735 P.2d 64 (1987) CASE BRIEF

STATE V. COATES
735 P.2d 64 (1987)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction for negligent assault.
FACTS: An off duty police officer noticed an accident and followed one of the cars. After about a half mile, the car's engine died and pulled off to the side of the road. The officer stopped his car. Coates (D) exited his car and walked toward the officer's vehicle. The officer identified himself as a policeman and told D to return to the accident scene. D replied that he was a navy corpsman and could help if anyone was injured. D returned to his car and then agreed to walk back to the accident scene. A few moments later, D changed his mind and the officer began to question D's mental stability and agreed with D to return to D's car. As they neared the car, D stabbed the officer twice in the back and then returned to his car. When questioned in jail, D was obviously intoxicated and he could not believe that anyone could have been stabbed. A breathalyzer test revealed a .16 level more than four hours after the accident. At trial, the officer testified about the incident and D claimed he could not remember the accident or the assault. The jury was instructed regarding the intoxication defense and that it only applied when the mental state is intent, knowledge, or recklessness thus excluding the defense from a negligent assault. D was found guilty of negligent assault. D appealed.

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UNITED STATES v. JEWELL 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976). CASE BRIEF

UNITED STATES V. JEWELL
532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction of a federal drug abuse law for the transportation and possession of marijuana under 21 U.S.C.S. 841(a)(1), which required possession of a controlled substance, knowledge of the nature of the act, and intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances.
FACTS: Jewell (D) and a friend went to Mexico in a rented car. D testified that while he was in Mexico, he was approached by a man who offered to sell him marijuana. When D refused that offer, the man then asked D if D would drive a car back to the U.S for $100. D looked over the car and found nothing illegal and agreed to drive the car to the U.S. D did see a special compartment when he opened the truck but D did not investigate further. The car contained a secret compartment in which marijuana was concealed. D was stopped at the border and arrested when marijuana was found in the secret compartment. D was arrested and charged with knowingly or intentionally importing a controlled substance and knowingly or intentionally possessing, with intent to distribute, a controlled substance. At trial, D testified that although he knew of the compartment, he did not know that the marijuana was present. The court instructed the jury that 'knowingly' meant voluntarily and intentionally and not by accident or mistake. The court told the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 'knowingly' brought the marijuana into the United States and that he 'knowingly' possessed the marijuana. The court continued: The Government can complete their burden of proof by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was not actually aware that there was marijuana in the vehicle he was driving when he entered the United States his ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely a result of his having made a conscious purpose to disregard the nature of that which was in the vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. D was convicted and appealed.

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COMMONWEALTH v. CALI 247 Mass. 20, 141 N.E. 510 (1923). CASE BRIEF

COMMONWEALTH V. CALI
247 Mass. 20, 141 N.E. 510 (1923).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal of a conviction for setting a fire with the intent to defraud an insurer after the denial of a motion for a directed verdict.
FACTS: Cali (D) set fire to a building belonging to a relative, Maria Cali. D was indicted for setting the fire with the intent to defraud an insurer. At trial, D offered evidence that the fire was set accidentally, but that he later made no attempt to put out the fire. Putting out the fire would have been easy to do with no great degree of risk. The court instructed the jury that if they found that D purposefully refrained from extinguishing the fire with the intent to collect the insurance money, he must be convicted. D was convicted. D appealed.

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COMMONWEALTH V. PESTINIKAS 617 A.2d 1339 (1992) CASE BRIEF

COMMONWEALTH V. PESTINIKAS
617 A.2d 1339 (1992)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Pestinkas (Ds) appealed guilty verdict of murder of the third degree in connection with the starvation and dehydration death of 92-year-old man who lived with Ds.
FACTS: Kly met Walter and Helen Pestinikas (Ds) in the latter part of 1981 when Kly consulted them about prearranging his funeral. In March, 1982, Kly was hospitalized and diagnosed as suffering from Zenker's diverticulum, a weakness in the walls of the esophagus, which caused him to have trouble swallowing food. When given food he was able to swallow he regained some of the weight which he had lost. When leaving the hospital, he expressed a desire not to return to his stepson's home and sent word to Ds that he wanted to speak with them. Arrangements were made for Ds to care for Kly in their home. When Ds came for him they were instructed by medical personnel regarding the care which was required for Kly and were given a prescription to have filled for him. Arrangements were also made for a visiting nurse to come to Ds' home to administer vitamin B-12 supplements to Kly. Ds agreed orally to follow the medical instructions and to supply Kly with food, shelter, care and the medicine which he required. The prescription was never filled, and the visiting nurse was told by Ds that Kly did not want the vitamin supplement shots and that her services, therefore, were not required. Kly did not get a room at Ds' house but instead he was placed in an enclosed porch of a building, which they owned, known as the Stage Coach Inn. This porch was approximately nine feet by thirty feet, with no insulation, no refrigeration, no bathroom, no sink and no telephone. The walls contained cracks which exposed the room to outside weather conditions. Ds' made affirmative efforts to conceal his whereabouts. They told members of Kly's family that they did not know where he had gone and others that he was living in their home. When Kly had been discharged Ds took Kly to the bank and had their names added to his savings account. Kly's money was transferred into an account in the names of Kly or Helen Pestinikas, pursuant to which moneys could be withdrawn without Kly's signature. From May, 1982, to July, 1983, Ds withdrew $300 per month. But those sums increased and when Kly died, a balance of only $55 remained. Ds had withdrawn in excess of $30,000. Kly's dead body appeared emaciated, with his ribs and sternum greatly pronounced. He had been dead for as many as thirty-nine (39) hours before his body was found. The cause of death was determined to be starvation and dehydration. Expert testimony opined that Kly would have experienced pain and suffering over a long period of time before he died. Ds were tried for murder and were convicted in that they contracted with Kly and then calculated to deprive Kly of those things necessary to maintain his life.

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PEOPLE V. NEWTON 8 Cal.App 3d 359, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394 (1970) CASE BRIEF

PEOPLE V. NEWTON
8 Cal.App 3d 359, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394 (1970)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction of voluntary manslaughter in the shooting of a police officer.
FACTS: Newton (D) was stopped by Officer Frey who ordered him out of his car. An altercation ensued. D had drawn a gun and in the struggle for possession Heanes, another officer, was wounded. At some point in the continuing altercation, D was shot in the midsection but D got the gun and fired several shots at Frey resulting in his death. D states that he had carried no gun and that the altercation had started when Frey struck him for protesting his arrest. D could not recollect with any certainty what or how Frey was shot. D called Bernard Diamond, M.D., who testified that D's recollections were 'compatible' with the gunshot wound he had received; and that '[a] gunshot wound which penetrates in a body cavity, the abdominal cavity or the thoracic cavity is very likely to produce a profound reflex shock reaction, that is quite different than a gunshot wound which penetrates only skin and muscle and it is not at all uncommon for a person shot in the abdomen to lose consciousness and go into this reflex shock condition for short periods of time up to half an hour or so. D wanted the jury to be instructed on the subject of unconsciousness as to the crime of homicide but he withdrew that request. The trial court refused to instruct on self-defense. The trial court fully and correctly instructed the jury on murder in the first degree (including the requisite elements of willfulness, deliberation, premeditation and malice aforethought) and in the second (including the element of malice aforethought). The court also gave instructions on voluntary manslaughter and diminished capacity. D was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. D appealed. D asserts prejudicial error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the subject of unconsciousness as a defense to a charge of criminal homicide.

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UNITED STATES V. GARRETT 984 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1993) CASE BRIEF

UNITED STATES V. GARRETT
984 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1993)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a violation of the Federal Aviation Act.
FACTS: Garrett (D) was a passenger attempting to board flight 457 from New Orleans. Passing through airport security, a gun was discovered in her handbag. D told security personnel that she had forgotten that the gun was in her purse. D was found guilty of Section 1472(l)(1) and given a $25 fine and five years probation. D was also ordered to reside in a halfway house for six months. The magistrate used a should have known standard for mens rea. D appealed; her conviction was invalid because it was not proven that she knew a gun was in fact in her purse. P argued that the statute imposed strict liability.

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GARNETT V. STATE 332 Md. 571 (1993) CASE BRIEF

GARNETT V. STATE
332 Md. 571 (1993)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction of statutory rape. Garnett (D) was convicted for second-degree rape of a victim in violation of Md. Code Ann. art. 27, 463(1957, 1992 repl. vol.). The trial court excluded as immaterial evidence that D was told the victim was at the age of consent. D appealed.
FACTS: Under Maryland law, a person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person: .... (3) Who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least four years older than the victim. Garnett (D) was a young retarded man who was 20 but with an I.Q. of 52. He was described as a mildly retarded person who read on the third-grade level, did arithmetic on the 5th-grade level, and interacted with others socially at school at the level of someone 11 or 12 years of age. Because he could not understand the duties of the jobs given him, he failed to complete vocational assignments; he sometimes lost his way to work. He was unable to pass any of the State's functional tests required for graduation, he received only a certificate of attendance rather than a high-school diploma. D was introduced to Erica Frazier, 13, and after a few interactions, went to her home, talked, and had sexual intercourse. Erica gave birth to a baby. D was tried on one count of second-degree rape. At trial evidence that Erica and her friends had told D that she was 16 was excluded at trial. At trial, the defense twice proffered evidence to the effect that Erica herself and her friends had previously told D that she was 16 years old, and that he had acted with that belief. The trial court excluded such evidence as immaterial, explaining: the only two requirements as relate to this case are that there was vaginal intercourse, [and] that . . . Ms. Frazier was under 14 years of age and that . . . D was at least four years older than she. The court held that consent is no defense to this charge. The victim's representation as to her age and the defendant's belief, if it existed, that she was not under age, what amounts to what otherwise might be termed a good faith defense, is in fact no defense to what amount[s] to statutory rape. This was a strict liability offense. D was found guilty and appealed.

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UNITED STATES V. YERMIAN 468 U.S. 63 (1984) CASE BRIEF

UNITED STATES V. YERMIAN
468 U.S. 63 (1984)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction for making false statements under 18 U.S.C. 1001.
FACTS: Yermian (D) was hired by Gulton Industries, a defense contractor. D was required to obtain a Department of Defense Security Clearance. D filed in a worksheet for that purpose. On that sheet, D failed to disclose that he had been convicted of mail fraud in 1978, that he had been employed by two companies that had never employed him, and then certified the answers as true complete and correct to the best of his knowledge and that he understood that any false statements made would subject him to prosecution under 1001. D was eventually discovered and charged with three violations of 1001. D's sole defense was that he had no actual knowledge that his false statements would be transmitted to a federal agency. D requested a jury instruction that conviction required that he knew the statements were false and that they would be submitted to a government agency. That instruction was overruled and D was convicted. The instruction given was that the Government must prove that D knew or should have known that the information was to be submitted to a government agency. The Court of Appeals reversed.

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ROPER V. SIMMONS 543 U.S. 551 (2005) CASE BRIEF

ROPER V. SIMMONS
543 U.S. 551 (2005)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over whether a 17-year-old could be sentenced to death for capital murder. Simmons (D) argued that Atkins v. Virginia, established that the Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under 18 when he committed his crime. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and set aside D's death sentence in favor of life imprisonment without eligibility for release; a national consensus has developed against the execution of those offenders.
FACTS: D was 17 and still a junior in high school. D said to his friends that he wanted to murder someone. D talked about his plan, discussing it for the most part with two friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, aged 15 and 16 respectively. D proposed to commit burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim, and throwing the victim off a bridge. D assured his friends they could 'get away with it' because they were minors. They met at about 2 a.m. on the night of the murder, but Tessmer left before the other two set out. D and Benjamin entered the home of the victim, Shirley Crook. When she was confronted by the burglars in her bedroom D recognized her from a previous car accident involving them both. This confirmed D's resolve to murder her. They used duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her hands, and put her in her minivan and drove to a state park. There they tied her hands and feet together with electrical wire, wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from the bridge, drowning her in the waters below. Fishermen recovered the victim's body from the river. D was arrested and waived his right to an attorney and agreed to answer questions. D confessed to the murder and agreed to perform a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene. D was charged with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and murder in the first degree. D was 17 at the time of the crime. D was tried as an adult. The defense called no witnesses in the guilt phase. The jury having returned a verdict of murder, the trial proceeded to the penalty phase. The State sought the death penalty. D's attorneys called family and friends to plead for his life. In closing arguments D's age was addressed and the trial judge instructed the jurors they could consider age as a mitigating factor. Defense counsel reminded the jurors that juveniles of Simmons' age cannot drink, serve on juries, or even see certain movies, because 'the legislatures have wisely decided that individuals of a certain age aren't responsible enough.' D argued that age should make 'a huge difference to [the jurors] in deciding just exactly what sort of punishment to make.' The jury recommended the death penalty. The trial judge imposed the death penalty. Eventually D filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that the reasoning of Atkins established that the Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under 18 when the crime was committed. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed: A national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders, as demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states now bar such executions for juveniles, that twelve other states bar executions altogether, that no state has lowered its age of execution below 18 since Stanford, that five states have legislatively or by case law raised or established the minimum age at 18, and that the imposition of the juvenile death penalty has become truly unusual over the last decade. D was resentenced to 'life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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GODFREY V. GEORGIA 446 U.S. 420 (1980) CASE BRIEF

GODFREY V. GEORGIA
446 U.S. 420 (1980)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a death sentence.
FACTS: Godfrey (D) and his wife of 28 years had a heated argument in their home. D had consumed several cans of beer, threatened his wife with a knife, and damaged some of her clothing. The wife announced that she was going to leave D. She departed and secured a warrant charging D with aggravated assault. She then filed for divorce and a court hearing was set two weeks later. Before that hearing, D asked her to return home but those pleas were rebuffed. After a heated phone argument, D got out his shotgun and walked down the road to where his mother in law lived and observed his mother in law, his wife, and his 11-year-old daughter playing cards. He pointed the shotgun at his wife and pulled the trigger. She was killed instantly. D then went into the trailer and struck his fleeing daughter and then fired the gun at his mother in law and killed her instantly. D then called the sheriff, confessed, and surrendered. D pled not guilty by reason of insanity but was convicted of all counts. D got the death penalty even with the judge reading the aggravating circumstances subsection of (b)(7) of Georgia code. The jury specified that it found that the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman. The judge found that there was no torture. D appealed and the Georgia Supremes affirmed even though D sought to hold (b)(7) unconstitutionally vague.

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STATE OF KANSAS V. SOPHOPHONE 19 P.3d 70 (2001) CASE BRIEF

STATE OF KANSAS V. SOPHOPHONE
19 P.3d 70 (2001)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This an appeal of a felony-murder conviction for the death of a co-felon during flight from an aggravated burglary in which both men participated.
FACTS: Sophophone (D) and three others conspired to and broke into a house in Emporia. The resident reported the break-in to the police. Police responded and saw four individuals leaving the back of the house, shined a light on the suspects, identified themselves as police officers, and ordered them to stop. They ran away. D was caught, hand-cuffed, and placed in a police car. Another officer chased Somphone Sysoumphone and when stopped the officer approached with his weapon drawn and ordered Sysoumphone to the ground and not to move. Sysoumphone was lying face down but raised up and fired at the officer, who returned fire and killed him. It is not disputed that Sysoumphone was one of the individuals observed by the officers leaving the house that had been burglarized. D was charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, obstruction of official duty, and felony murder. D moved to dismiss the felony-murder charges, contending the complaint was defective because it alleged that he and not the police officer had killed Sysoumphone and further because he was in custody and sitting in the police car when the deceased was killed and therefore not attempting to commit or even fleeing from an inherently dangerous felony. His motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. D was convicted by a jury of all counts. D appeals his conviction of felony murder.

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FREDDO V. STATE 155 S.W. 170 (1913) CASE BRIEF

FREDDO V. STATE
155 S.W. 170 (1913)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction of second degree murder.
FACTS: Freddo (D) was 19 years of age and employed at a railroad company. Higginbotham was six years older than D and was taller and outweighed D by 30 lbs. Higginbotham had called D a son of a bitch. D without meaning offense asked Higginbotham to stop calling him that. Higginbotham repeated the saying to D. D was noticeably upset by the use of those words and even other sought out Higginbotham and told him to stop. D and Higginbotham were working together when an oil spill found Higginbotham calling D names again. D then seized a steel bar and hit Higginbotham with it because D thought that he was coming after him so he hit him. D was indicted for murder in the first degree and found guilty of second degree murder. D contends that he should have only been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. D appealed.

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GARNETT V. STATE 332 Md. 571 (1993) CASE BRIEF

GARNETT V. STATE
332 Md. 571 (1993)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a conviction of statutory rape. Garnett (D) was convicted for second-degree rape of a victim in violation of Md. Code Ann. art. 27, 463(1957, 1992 repl. vol.). The trial court excluded as immaterial evidence that D was told the victim was at the age of consent. D appealed.
FACTS: Under Maryland law, a person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person: .... (3) Who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least four years older than the victim. Garnett (D) was a young retarded man who was 20 but with an I.Q. of 52. He was described as a mildly retarded person who read on the third-grade level, did arithmetic on the 5th-grade level, and interacted with others socially at school at the level of someone 11 or 12 years of age. Because he could not understand the duties of the jobs given him, he failed to complete vocational assignments; he sometimes lost his way to work. He was unable to pass any of the State's functional tests required for graduation, he received only a certificate of attendance rather than a high-school diploma. D was introduced to Erica Frazier, 13, and after a few interactions, went to her home, talked, and had sexual intercourse. Erica gave birth to a baby. D was tried on one count of second-degree rape. At trial evidence that Erica and her friends had told D that she was 16 was excluded at trial. At trial, the defense twice proffered evidence to the effect that Erica herself and her friends had previously told D that she was 16 years old, and that he had acted with that belief. The trial court excluded such evidence as immaterial, explaining: the only two requirements as relate to this case are that there was vaginal intercourse, [and] that . . . Ms. Frazier was under 14 years of age and that . . . D was at least four years older than she. The court held that consent is no defense to this charge. The victim's representation as to her age and the defendant's belief, if it existed, that she was not under age, what amounts to what otherwise might be termed a good faith defense, is in fact no defense to what amount[s] to statutory rape. This was a strict liability offense. D was found guilty and appealed.

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STATE V. SMITH 554 A.2d 713 (1989) CASE BRIEF

STATE V. SMITH
554 A.2d 713 (1989)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Smith (D) sought review of a judgment, which convicted him of sexual assault in the first degree.
FACTS: T, was a 26-year-old woman, that went to D's apartment the first night she met D after D paid for her dinner. T and D were introduced by a friend. When at the apartment T claimed that D would not back off after he gave T the first kiss. T verbally complained about D not letting go of her. D also claimed that he had not paid for her dinner earlier for nothing. T claimed she spit on his face, tried kicking him off, but eventually T realized that it was useless to resist because D indicated that he would make it hard on her, and then she decided to give in. She testified at trial, that after she decided to give in that she tried to convince D that she was not going to fight and was going to go along with him and enjoy it. They had sex in the bedroom and when asked for her number T gave D a fake phone number. She accepted sherbet ice cream as she waited for a cab to take her home. T placed her pink cigarette lighter under the couch to prove that she had been there. She left and told the cab driver to take her to the police station and she filed a complaint. D was arrested and the cigarette lighter was just where she had placed it. D was convicted and D appealed.

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STATE V. JONES 299 P.3d 219 (2013) CASE BRIEF

STATE V. JONES
299 P.3d 219 (2013)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Jones (D) appealed a decision that reversed on one count of rape but not a second.
FACTS: D, Craig Carpenter, and A.S., were longtime friends. Carpenter and A.S. were engaged and had children. Unbeknownst to Carpenter, D and A.S. had been sexually involved for approximately four years. During a roadtrip, A.S. and D decided they would end their affair. Even so, they returned to A.S.'s apartment and engaged in consensual sex that morning. A.S. went to the bathroom and then returned to the bedroom. D was looking at pornographic material on the computer. D sat next to A.S. on the bed and started touching her, and she responded by telling him that 'I thought we had decided that the time before [] was the last time and it wasn't going to happen anymore.' D got behind her and was undoing his pants when A.S. said no. D then leaned forward, and A.S. was pushed down to where she couldn't get up, and D started having sex with her. A.S 'kept yelling at him and pleading for him to stop and please quit,' which he ignored. D apologized to A.S. afterwards. D admitted that he 'lost control.' A.S. contacted the Boise State University Women's Center. She told a counselor that she had been raped and was advised to call the police, which she did not do. Thereafter, A.S. continued to be in contact with D and subsequently took roadtrips with him again. D went to A.S.'s apartment to watch movies. He spent the night and remained there in the morning after Carpenter left for work and A.S.'s children went to school. A.S. was taking an antihistamine for a bee sting and a prescription anti-anxiety medication, both of which caused her to feel drowsy. She laid down on the living room couch and started to 'drift off.' D tested her to see if she was conscious, then proceeded to pull down A.S.'s pants and underwear, and 'pushed [her] legs apart and started having sex with [her].' A.S. 'just froze,' and testified that she was 'paralyzed' with fear. D and A.S. went to the bedroom and shared a cigarette. D helped A.S. into bed and once again started to have sexual intercourse with her. She asked him to stop and he did. Based on the first incident in the bedroom and the second on the couch, D was charged with two counts of forcible rape. D went to A.S.'s apartment to watch movies. He spent the night and remained there in the morning after Carpenter left for work and A.S.'s children went to school. A.S. was taking an antihistamine for a bee sting and a prescription anti-anxiety medication, both of which caused her to feel drowsy. She laid down on the living room couch and started to 'drift off.' D tested her to see if she was conscious, then proceeded to pull down A.S.'s pants and underwear, and 'pushed [her] legs apart and started having sex with [her].' A.S. 'just froze,' and testified that she was 'paralyzed' with fear. D and A.S. went to the bedroom and shared a cigarette. D helped A.S. into bed and once again started to have sexual intercourse with her. She asked him to stop and he did. Based on the first incident in the bedroom and the second on the couch, D was charged with two counts of forcible rape. At trial, A.S. admitted she had never informed police that she and D were sexually involved during the four years prior to the incidents. She also admitted her statements to the police were incomplete where she did not reveal that she and D had had consensual sex earlier in the day on the first instance. She did not show officers text messages sent by her to D that indicated that she loved him (and that would have revealed their relationship). She admitted that even at the time of trial, she was still concealing her relationship with D from Carpenter. During cross-examination, D focused on a letter that A.S. wrote, had notarized, and gave to the prosecution before trial. In it, she recanted her allegations of rape, asserted that D was wrongfully charged, and characterized the incidents as a misunderstanding between her and D. But A.S. subsequently sent another letter to the prosecutor that retracted her retraction-she maintained that counseling had induced a change of heart and that she indeed wished to go forward with the charges. The State presented the testimony of the nurse who examined A.S. after the second incident. The nurse stated that A.S. was 'visibly frightened' during their interaction: crying, avoiding eye contact, and speaking very softly. During the examination, A.S. 'had her knees to her chest, kind of holding herself' and afterwards she laid down and 'just kind of curled up.' The nurse further testified that she found no physical evidence of trauma consistent with rape-there was no bruising, scrapes, or scratches on A.S.'s body. The issues presented are whether verbal resistance qualifies as resistance under Idaho's forcible rape statute and the amount of force required to overcome this resistance.

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RUFFIN V. STATE 270 S.W.3d 586 (2008) CASE BRIEF

RUFFIN V. STATE
270 S.W.3d 586 (2008)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Ruffin (D) appealed a conviction and affirmation by the court of appeals of first degree aggravated assault on grounds trial judge excluded testimony by D's psychologist about the existence and severity of his mental disease and delusions, ruling that such expert testimony is admissible only when the defendant is accused of homicide or pleads insanity.
FACTS: D's neighbors called the Sheriff's Department to report gunshots from D's property. Deputy Carol Brown had known D and his family for more than ten years and had once worked at his skating rink as a security guard. A month before D's wife, had told Carol that D's mental health was deteriorating. Deputy Brown had informed the sheriff's office of D's condition, so that evening two officers were dispatched to investigate the gunshots. Two dogs ran up to them, one was bloody and looked like it had been shot. They heard gunshots from inside and, shortly thereafter, they heard D yelling from the woods, 'Get the hell out of here!' A few seconds later, they heard more shooting, so they ran back to Carol's patrol car, took cover behind the car door, and radioed for assistance. The wounded dog leapt into the patrol car and wouldn't get out. He kept stepping on the brake pedal, which turned on the brake lights and illuminated the officers hiding behind the patrol car door. D shouted, 'Carol, get the hell out of here before you get hurt.' D kept yelling. He repeatedly shouted, 'I'm declaring marshal [martial?] law. Carol, get out of here.' D sounded bizarre and irrational. Throughout the night, appellant sporadically shot at the officers, but injured no one. Many officers arrived at the scene. Eventually he was talked outside and arrested. Several lay witnesses testified concerning D's mental status. D had become obsessed with the color orange and thought that everything should be orange. He talked to the television set and thought that it talked back. He would pull his cigarette lighter out and say, 'Okay, Johnny, I know you're listening to me,' and stick it back in his shirt pocket. He took all of the appliances out of the house because they were bugged, and he wore a T-shirt with aluminum foil on it to protect himself from receiving signals from the tower. HIs wife finally moved out of their home in March. When she talked to D the day before the standoff and he admitted that he needed to see a doctor, she agreed to come back home and help. Dr. William Lee Carter, who said that, in his professional opinion, D had fallen into a deep depression in the months before the standoff and had become psychotic. He began to suffer from delusions, paranoid thinking, and irrationality. Dr. Carter had twice seen D in the county jail after the standoff, and then saw him three more times in his office. Dr. Carter explained that a person who is delusional typically believes that his delusions are true. And a person who is experiencing paranoia has beliefs that people are out to get him, a lot of suspiciousness, considerable mistrust. D was suffering from psychotic symptoms. After this proffer, the trial judge excluded Dr. Carter's testimony because [t]he insanity defense is what is indicated and dictated as our way of determining the capacity of the defendant to make a specific mens rea. The procedure for doing that is through the insanity defense. D was convicted. On appeal, D claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Carter's testimony that, because of mental illness and delusions, D did not know that he was shooting at law-enforcement officers. The court of appeals concluded that evidence of a mental illness or defect that negates the mens rea of an offense is admissible only in a murder trial.

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STATE V. SEXTON 904 A.2d 1092 (Vt. 2006) CASE BRIEF

STATE V. SEXTON
904 A.2d 1092 (Vt. 2006)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an interlocutory appeal to consider whether a Sexton (D), charged with murder, may assert either the defense of diminished capacity to reduce the offense to manslaughter, or insanity to excuse the offense entirely, where the voluntary use of illegal drugs was an essential causal factor in the defendant's psychotic state at the time of the offense.
FACTS: Police found Atsuko Ikeda, lying in the street in Winooski. Ikeda had suffered serious injuries, and died shortly after transport to the hospital. Sexton (D) walked onto the crime scene and lay down on the street in front of a police cruiser. D reportedly said, 'Just cuff me, I know I did something bad, I just don't know what.' D was charged with Ikeda's murder. D informed the police that, on the day in question, he had killed his cat and then gone outside intending to kill a person. He recalled lunging at a woman passing on a bicycle (later identified as Ikeda) and then beating her repeatedly until she stopped moving. D later told psychiatrists that he had taken a variety of illegal drugs during the six months preceding the incident. D stated that for about two months, in July and August 2000, he took many 'hits' of LSD, and that his last reported use of LSD was two to three weeks before the September killing. D explained that on the night of the incident he felt that he needed to kill people and 'gather their souls.' D was arraignment on a charge of second-degree murder. Dr. Robert Linder, a court appointed psychologist, concluded that D was insane at the time of the offense. D suffered from either a previously undiagnosed mental disease involving a schizophrenic disorder, or a substance-induced psychosis. In December 2000 Dr. Linder indicated that D's mental state had improved over the course of their interviews and that he appeared to be competent to stand trial. D notified the State that he intended to present expert testimony in support of an insanity defense, and the court granted the State's motion for an independent psychiatric evaluation. The State's psychiatrist, Dr. Albert Drukteinis, filed a report concurring in Dr. Linder's opinion that D was psychotic at the time of the offense, but concluding that it was caused solely by D's voluntary use of illegal drugs. P filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent D from presenting an insanity defense at trial, arguing that Vermont law does not recognize temporary insanity caused by the voluntary use of drugs. P also moved to preclude a diminished capacity defense, asserting that second-degree murder based on wanton disregard for the likelihood that one's actions would naturally cause death or great bodily harm is a general intent crime to which the defense has no application. The court held that second-degree murder based on wanton disregard of the likelihood that one's conduct would naturally cause death or great bodily harm is a specific intent crime in Vermont. D was entitled to rely on the defense of diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication. The following June, the court issued a second decision, concluding that D was also entitled to argue that he was legally insane at the time of the killing. Although the court ruled that 'an individual whose mental state is altered solely because of the consumption and abuse of illegal drugs' may not assert an insanity defense, it found that one whose consumption of illegal drugs activates a latent mental disease or defect resulting in a psychotic reaction is entitled to a complete defense to the crime charged, unless D knew or had reason to know that the drugs would elicit such a reaction. P filed this interlocutory appeal of both orders.

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IN RE THE WELFARE OF J.H. 844 N.W.2d 28 (2014) CASE BRIEF

IN RE THE WELFARE OF J.H.
844 N.W.2d 28 (2014)
NATURE OF THE CASE: State appealed a reversal of a determination that J.H.(D) was to stand trial as an adult in district court.
FACTS: The victim (G.K.) was 14 years old and told a sexual assault nurse at Children's Hospital that she had been raped by gang members. Two gang members forcibly removed G.K. from the car and carried her into a bedroom in the house. G.K. was screaming and resisted going into the bedroom. G.K. was pushed down onto a mattress, her clothing was removed, and then she was held down by several of the gang members and raped by another gang member. Someone in the room yelled 'police,' and everybody ran out of the bedroom and the house. G.K. told police that there were between six and eight individuals in the bedroom, including D, during the rape. There was plenty of testimony. D admitted that he was a TB22 gang member and showed police his gang tattoo. D stated that he was in the room when the rape occurred. D admitted that the rape stopped because someone said the police were coming. The State filed a juvenile petition alleging D was delinquent based on first-degree criminal sexual conduct, conspiracy to commit first-degree criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, and committing a crime for the benefit of a gang. D was charged as both a principal and as an accomplice. The State presented evidence consistent with the police investigation. The State argued the seriousness of the offense. The court certified D to stand trial as an adult in district court; D had not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court would serve public safety. Of the six public safety factors only D's lack of a prior record of delinquency was in his favor. The court rejected opinions that public safety would be served by designating D for EJJ prosecution because, among other reasons, they were unable to testify that even with the available programming it was likely that D would not pose a threat to public safety. A divided court of appeals reversed. The juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to expressly weigh the seriousness of the alleged offense and D's prior record of delinquency separately from the other public safety factors and by failing to specifically delineate how its determination of these two factors impacted its certification decision. The State appealed.

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IN RE THE WELFARE OF D.F.B. 433 N.W.2d 79 (1988) CASE BRIEF

IN RE THE WELFARE OF D.F.B.
433 N.W.2d 79 (1988)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Juvenile (D) appealed a decision, which reversed a decision of the district court that denied a motion by the State (P) to refer the juvenile for prosecution as an adult.
FACTS: D, age 16, used an ax to kill his parents and a younger brother and younger sister. Experts agree that D had been depressed for a number of years, that he was experiencing severe depression at the time he committed the murders, and that his feeling that he was trapped in a family situation not to his liking somehow led him to the conclusion that the only remedy was to kill the parents. D killed the younger siblings not because he was angry with them but to spare them further pain. The issue was whether D is unamenable to treatment in the juvenile court system consistent with the public safety.
One doctor said no way, and the second said D could be treated successfully in 2-1/2 years, and probably in considerably less time. Even that doctor acknowledged that many such depressed people fail in treatment and/or have recurrences after treatment. The district court concluded that D had produced substantial evidence of amenability to treatment in the juvenile court system consistent with the public safety. The court denied P's petition to try D as an adult. The court of appeals held that keeping D in the juvenile court system is inconsistent with the intent of the legislature expressed in those amendments and it therefore reversed the district court. D appealed.

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IN RE DAHL278 N.W. 2d 316 (1979) CASE BRIEF

IN RE DAHL
278 N.W. 2d 316 (1979)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This case involves the courts discretion as to when a juvenile offender should or should not be referred for prosecution as an adult. It is interesting because it shows how legislatures can enact vague statutes that give little guidance and wide discretion to judges.
FACTS: On April 8, 1978 the body of Rick Alan McGuire was found in a remote area. He was shot in the head by a shotgun. A delinquency petition was filed against Dahl (D) for the first degree murder of Ricky Alan McGuire. D admitted to the killing and was 17 at the time of the murder. D's parents describe him as respectful and obedient. D had never been in serious trouble with the law prior to this murder and D had maintained a B average in high school while holding down a part time job and participating in athletics. He was a steady and industrious worker. The trial court observed that the D was not a typical delinquent and that he had no prior history that could have predicted this outcome. D was then referred for adult prosecution because it was determined that the juvenile court could not successfully treat D in the time remaining before its jurisdiction would expire. The other reason for the referral was based on the serious nature of the crime and D's alleged threat to public safety. D appeals the referral for adult prosecution.

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IN RE TYVONNE 558 A.2d 661 (1989) CASE BRIEF

IN RE TYVONNE
558 A.2d 661 (1989)
NATURE OF THE CASE: This case involves the defense of infancy as it relates to crimes committed by minors. The question that the court asks is whether the defense of infancy applies to noncriminal juvenile proceedings.
FACTS: Tyvonne (D), an 8-year-old child, found a pistol while playing in a school yard. Tyvonne hid the gun and then showed it to friends of his at school. Several of his friends said that the gun was a toy and one child challenged Tyvonne. The child said 'Shoot me, shoot me' to prove that the gun was a toy. Tyvonne shot the other child and she was injured. Tyvonne was then taken into police custody. The state (P) then filed a petition against Tyvonne that alleged delinquent behavior. This was not a criminal charge, but was meant to protect the child and to give him a new direction in life. The trial court found that Tyvonne committed assault and was delinquent. Tyvonne was committed to Youth Services for a maximum of four years. Tyvonne now appeals and claims that he should have been allowed to use the defense of infancy.

ISSUE:


RULE OF LAW:


HOLDING AND DECISION:


LEGAL ANALYSIS:





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UNITED STATES V. HANEY 287 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2002) CASE BRIEF

UNITED STATES V. HANEY
287 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2002)
NATURE OF THE CASE: Haney (D) appeals his conviction and sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(2) (possession of escape paraphernalia in prison). D asserts that the district court erred not permitting him to raise a defense of duress.
FACTS: On his first escape from prison Francis faced a severe dilemma. The TV show America's Most Wanted had incorrectly labeled Francis as the leader of the Aryan Brotherhood. This was not true but Francis had reason to fear retaliation from both African-American prison gangs and from the Aryan Brotherhood itself. At the prison facility where Francis was housed, there was a large amount of racial tension and the facility was even locked down for ten days due to that tension. Also, going to prison authorities would have labeled Francis as a snitch. Francis had been threatened by three African American inmates who had seen the TV show. They labeled him a target when the shit jumps off. Francis concluded that his only option was to attempt a prison escape. D agreed to help Francis. D used his position as an employee in the prison laundry to collect a variety of escape paraphernalia. Francis was threatened again and that provided renewed impetus for the escape attempt. They started their escape and hid in the prison yard. D endeavored to convince Francis that an escape attempt was, imprudent; D argued, in effect: '[T]he best possible solution would be to get caught trying to escape, thereby getting placed into disciplinary segregation without having to report the death threats to prison officials.' Francis ultimately agreed. After two hours the two inmates were finally caught. The United States charged both Francis and D with possession of escape paraphernalia in prison and attempted escape. At trial, the court instructed Francis' jury on duress as a defense to both charges. D's court refused to give a duress instruction on either count. The jury convicted both of possessing escape paraphernalia but acquitted both of attempting to escape. In acquitting Francis of the attempted escape, the jury expressly invoked the duress defense. D appealed.

ISSUE:


RULE OF LAW:


HOLDING AND DECISION:


LEGAL ANALYSIS:





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