Law School Case Briefs: cert. denied

Showing posts with label cert. denied. Show all posts

CLIFTON INV. CO. V. COMMISSIONER 312 F.2d 719, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 921 (1963) CASE BRIEF

CLIFTON INV. CO. V. COMMISSIONER

312 F.2d 719, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 921 (1963)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a condemnation of property and the tax status of the proceeds used to purchase a hotel. Clifton (P) challenged a Tax Court holding, which entered judgment for the IRS (D) in a dispute over whether P was entitled to the non-recognition of gain under 26 U.S.C.S. 1033(a)(3)(A).

FACTS: P was forced to sell his office building to the City of Cincinnati under threat of eminent domain. P held the building for the production of income. P then used the funds from the proceeds of that sale to purchase 80% of the Times Square Hotel of New York, an Ohio corporation that as its sole asset had a contract to buy the Times Square Hotel of New York City. The purchase of the hotel was affected by the corporation. The IRS did not view the sale as a similar one or one related in service to use to the office building; thus it gave no recognition under 1033(a)(3)(A). P contends that both properties were productive rental income. The tax court agreed with the IRS.

ISSUE:

RULE OF LAW:

HOLDING AND DECISION:

LEGAL ANALYSIS:

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BOWERS V. LUMPKIN 140 F.2d 927, cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (4th Cir. 1944) CASE BRIEF

BOWERS V. LUMPKIN

140 F.2d 927, cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (4th Cir. 1944)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the deduction of legal fees to determine title to stock.

FACTS: Lumpkin (P) had a life interest under a trust created by a will of her former husband to 1/2 of the stock of a corporation that had the rights to distribute cola syrup in South Carolina. P purchased the remaining stock of the corporation for $225,885 from the trustees to whom it had been bequeathed to establish an orphanage. The Attorney General of South Carolina instituted an action to invalidate the sale and to require P to account for the profits. P defended the suit at a cost in excess of $27,000. P then deducted these expenses from the tax years in question and they were denied by the IRS. P contends that these expenses, under 121(a), were deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses for carrying on a trade or business and were allowable as deductions from gross income. Under the expanded rules P claimed that the property was held for production of income and the money was spent in connection with that production.

BIEDENHARN REALTY CO. V. UNITED STATES 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) CASE BRIEF

BIEDENHARN REALTY CO. V. UNITED STATES

526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over property held for sale primarily to customers in the ordinary course of business or trade.

FACTS: Biedenharn (P) was organized in 1923 to hold and manage family investments held in commercial real estate, a stock portfolio, motel, warehouses, a shopping center, residential real property and farm property. A plantation was purchased for $50,000 in 1935 totaling 973 acres and was bought for farming. It was farmed for a few years and then leased. From 1939 to 1965 three residential subdivisions were carved from the plantation. The profit on the sale of the lots was $800,000. In a pre-1964 settlement with the government it was agreed that 60% of the gain would be reported as ordinary and 40% as capital. P then reported its gains from 1964 to 1966 on the same basis. The IRS asserted a deficiency arguing that all the gains were ordinary income. P paid the monies and asserted a refund claiming the gains to be capital. P also sold 275 acres of the plantation in sales other than subdivision sales in 12 separate sales starting in 1935. P sold a total of 934 lots from other property that it owned and made improvements in the plantation subdivisions costing $200,000 for streets, drainage, water, sewage and electricity. The District Court held that the plantation was bought for investment and the intent to subdivide was prompted by the expansion of the city of Monroe and that sales resulted from unsolicited offers by individuals and that from 1964 to 1966 75% of the sales were induced by independent brokers.

AUTOCEPHALOUS GREEK-ORTHODOX CHURCH OF CYPRUS V. GOLDBERG & FELDMAN FINE ARTS, INC. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991) CASE BRIEF

AUTOCEPHALOUS GREEK-ORTHODOX CHURCH OF CYPRUS V. GOLDBERG & FELDMAN FINE ARTS, INC.

917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the ownership of four Byzantine mosaics

FACTS: Vandals in war torn Cyprus plundered a Greek Church removing anything of value from its interior. The mosaic in question had been ripped from the apse of the church and the church was converted into a stable for farm animals. The Republic of Cyprus took immediate steps to recover the looted mosaics. The word was spread to experts and scholars who would probably be involved in any intimate sale of the mosaics. These efforts have paid off as may stolen relics and antiquities were returned. The four mosaics at issue from the Kanakaria Church were located. Peg Goldberg is an art dealer and gallery operator. She bought the four mosaics while on a trip to Europe for her gallery. Peg learned that the people she was doing business with had criminal backgrounds related to art theft and forgery. Peg was fed a story about how the work was found in the rubble of an extinct church in Northern Cyprus. A purchase price of $1,080,000 was agreed upon and the parties agreed to split the profits from any resale; this was memorialized in a written contract. Peg then went to the bank to get a loan for the purchase and the bank agreed provided that appraisals and other documents substantiating the transaction were presented. Peg obtained three appraisals with the help of the sellers and the mosaics came in at between $3-6 million. Peg inspected the four mosaics in a free port area of the Geneva airport. During the few days before the closing transactions Peg called around to make sure that the pieces were not stolen and that no treaties would prevent her from taking them to the U.S. This part of Peg's testimony was clearly doubted by the judge during trial as no records of her claimed extensive search existed. The judge was sure that Peg did not contact the Republic of Cyprus or the TRNC, the Church of Cyprus, Interpol, nor a single disinterested expert on Byzantine art. The case transaction was accomplished and Peg got a general bill of sale. Eventually the articles were put up for sale but the Cyprus officials soon discovered the stolen artifacts. During the trial, the judge awarded possession of the mosaics to the Church of Cyprus. Peg appealed.

AUTOCEPHALOUS GREEK-ORTHODOX CHURCH OF CYPRUS V. GOLDBERG & FELDMAN FINE ARTS, INC. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991) CASE BRIEF

AUTOCEPHALOUS GREEK-ORTHODOX CHURCH OF CYPRUS V. GOLDBERG & FELDMAN FINE ARTS, INC.

917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the ownership of four Byzantine mosaics

AUTOCEPHALOUS GREEK-ORTHODOX CHURCH OF CYPRUS V. GOLDBERG & FELDMAN FINE ARTS, INC. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991) CASE BRIEF

AUTOCEPHALOUS GREEK-ORTHODOX CHURCH OF CYPRUS V. GOLDBERG & FELDMAN FINE ARTS, INC.

917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the ownership of four Byzantine mosaics

O'BRIEN V. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC'Y 212 F.2d 383, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 835 (1954) CASE BRIEF

O'BRIEN V. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC'Y

212 F.2d 383, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 835 (1954)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an action for recovery under a double indemnity insurance policy.

FACTS: An insurance policy provided payment of $10,000 upon the death of the insured with an additional $10,000 in the event of accidental death. At the time of the insured's death, he was committing an assault or a felony or both. A Robert Jackson shot the insured when he was found in bed with Jackson's wife. Jackson's wife substantiated that testimony and testified that she was forced into the bedroom and onto the bed but does not remember what happened from that point forward until the first shot was fired. At trial P presented evidence that the insured was killed by a gunshot wound and rested. D moved for a directed verdict and when denied put on the evidence of Jackson et al. P then offered evidence that robbery may have been the motive for the shooting. At the close of evidence, the trial court sustained D's motion for a directed verdict. P appealed.

LLOYD V. AMERICAN EXPORT LINES, INC. 580 F.2d 1179, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (3rd. Cir. 1978) CASE BRIEF

LLOYD V. AMERICAN EXPORT LINES, INC.

580 F.2d 1179, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (3rd. Cir. 1978)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a negligence action. American (D) appealed from an adverse Jones Act verdict, which in part denied admission under the former testimony exception of a transcript of a Coast Guard hearing.

FACTS: Lloyd got into a fight with Alvarez on a ship called the SS Export Commerce. The fight occurred in Yokohama in 1974. Lloyd sued American Export (D) alleging negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under general maritime law. D impleaded Alvarez as a third party defendant. Alvarez then counterclaimed against D, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness. Lloyd disappeared and the claims of Alvarez came to trial. Alvarez contended that D was liable because Lloyd started the fight and D argued that Alvarez started the fight. Alvarez testified to his version of the events and D then resorted to the former testimony exception and sought unsuccessfully to introduce a transcript of Lloyd's testimony taken by a Coast Guard hearing examiner to determine if Lloyd's merchant marine documents should be suspended or revoked for misconduct. Both Lloyd and Alvarez were represented by counsel at that hearing and each testified under oath. The jury returned the verdict to Alvarez and awarded him $95,000 but rejected the unseaworthiness claim. D appealed; it was error to exclude the Coast Guard hearing transcript.

LLOYD V. AMERICAN EXPORT LINES, INC. 580 F.2d 1179, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (3rd. Cir. 1978) CASE BRIEF

LLOYD V. AMERICAN EXPORT LINES, INC.

580 F.2d 1179, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (3rd. Cir. 1978)

TROUTMAN V. SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO., 441 F.2d 586, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). CASE BRIEF

TROUTMAN V. SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO

441 F.2d 586, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from a damages award for a breach of contract.

FACTS: Southern Railway (D) was ordered to raise its rates on grain shipments. D sought injunctive relief and sued the Interstate Commerce Commission. D also asked Troutman (P) to present its case to President Kennedy. D prevailed. P was never paid for his services (a joint development project) and demanded money. D refused and P sued. D claimed that the suit was barred by the Statute of Limitations and that a contract to influence government officials is void as against public policy. The jury found for P. D appealed.

FRANCOIS v. FRANCOIS 599 F.2d 1286 (3rd Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 US. 1021 (1980). CASE BRIEF

FRANCOIS V. FRANCOIS

599 F.2d 1286 (3rd Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 US. 1021 (1980)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an appeal from an order rescinding a property settlement agreement. Francois (D) appealed from the judgment contending that the district court erred in setting aside a property and separation agreement with Francois (P), and erred in placing the burden of proof on her to demonstrate the fairness of the transaction.

FACTS: Jane (D) married Victor (P). D was 30 with two previous children, two divorces, and no significant assets. P was 50, and had a significant amount of assets. During their marriage, D persuaded P to assign control of almost all of his assets to her. D then decided to divorce P and she retained an attorney who drafted a property settlement agreement that was extraordinarily disadvantageous to P. D told P that unless he signed the agreement there was no hope for the marriage. P's attorney advised P not to sign the agreement. P signed the agreement even though it conveyed all his remaining securities and his one-half interest in the marital home to D. D divorced P within a year. P sued D for rescission of the agreement and a reconveyance of the properties because of undue influence. The trial court found for P. D appealed.

MAYER V. PETZELT, 311 F.2d 601, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 936 (7th Cir. 1962) CASE BRIEF

MAYER V. PETZELT

311 F.2d 601, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 936 (7th Cir. 1962)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a personal injury action.

FACTS: In a personal injury action the jury returned a general verdict for P with a special interrogatory against him on the question of due care. The court entered judgment for D. The injury resulted with P violated a traffic law and then drove into a dark alley behind his hotel and D followed in his police motorcycle. While D was attempting to arrest P, P ran and fell in the alley and was injured. D's conduct during the arrest was not proper for a police officer and in a prior incident just one month before D drug P back to the police station for telling a lie and in the process ripped his shirt. During the incident in question, D did not have his flashlight or ticket book and went at P hollering and shaking the car violently when P got out of the car and ran down the alley and was injured. P appealed.

PUBLIC CITIZEN V. LIGGETT GROUP, 858 F.2d 775, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989) CASE BRIEF

PUBLIC CITIZEN V. LIGGETT GROUP

858 F.2d 775, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the removing of a protective order.

FACTS: Public Citizen (P) intervened in a lawsuit to modify a protective order barring nonlitigatory use of documents discovered in an action against Liggett (D) for wrongful death from cigarette smoking. That suit was dismissed on the basis that the claim was preempted by the federal cigarette labeling statute. The district court granted P's motion and D appealed.

GRUNIN V. INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF PANCAKES, 513 F.2d 114, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (8th Cir. 1975) CASE BRIEF

GRUNIN V. INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF PANCAKES

513 F.2d 114, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (8th Cir. 1975)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a proposed settlement.

FACTS: This was a class action against IHOP (D) in that the franchise agreements and equipment leases executed between D and its franchisees violated the Sherman Act.; D illegally tied the franchise agreement to the lease or purchase of a wide variety of essential products and services from D or a D approved supplier. P also claimed that these mandatory services and equipment purchases had been supplied as prices greatly in excess of fair market value. Settlement was offered for $4.025 million but that settlement did not amend the leases in any material aspect. The court rejected the proposed settlement. Another settlement proposal was submitted that allowed each class member to purchase his own equipment or to continue to lease at a reduced rate from D; the only required purchase was of pancake flour and coffee. Other concession were granted and a fund of $500,000 for the subclass of former franchisees was set up and attorney fees were paid; $1.25 million. Gurnin (P) voiced his objections to the agreement but the district court approved the settlement. P claimed that the notice sent to the classes involved was so inadequate that it violated Rule 23. P appealed.

BRITTON V. GANNON 285 P.2d 407, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 886 (1955) CASE BRIEF

BRITTON V. GANNON

285 P.2d 407, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 886 (1955)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a judgment alleged to have been procured by extrinsic fraud.

FACTS: Gannon (P) sued Britton (D) on a foreign judgment rendered in favor of P for $18,000 in Illinois. D answered that P was only a nominal party and that the real party in interest, Spike, the brother of P advised D that he was filing a suit to recovery personal property owned by him and D and that P was a necessary defendant but that no judgment would be taken against P. P made no effort to defend the Illinois suit and discovered the judgment when P sued in this instance. P proved his claim and D was not permitted to defend with the extrinsic fraud evidence. Judgment was given P. D appealed.

BANK OF MONTREAL V. OLAFSSON, 648 F.2d 1078, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (6th Cir. 1981) CASE BRIEF

BANK OF MONTREAL V. OLAFSSON

648 F.2d 1078, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (6th Cir. 1981)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a default judgment.

FACTS: P was a Canadian corporation and D was a citizen of Iceland. P sued D to recovery $34,572 due on a promissory note and overdraft. The District Court granted a default judgment and P filed liens on Michigan property held in D's wife's name and the property was sold. D moved the set the judgment aside in that he was never served and that he had declared bankruptcy in Canada and under Canadian law it was illegal to pursue claims while bankruptcy was pending and that there was no diversity. The trial court found for D on the no diversity issue and concluded under Rule 60(b)(4 or 6) that the judgment should be vacated because it was entered in excess of the power of the court. D set aside the sales and vacated the judgment. P appealed.

FAGNAN V. GREAT CENTRAL INSURANCE CO., 577 F.2d 418, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (7th Cir. 1978) CASE BRIEF

FAGNAN V. GREAT CENTRAL INSURANCE CO.

577 F.2d 418, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (7th Cir. 1978)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was an action relating to an auto accident.

FACTS: A car crash resulted in the death of Robert Thompson and injuries to his passenger David Harness. The drive of the other car, Duane Fagnan was also injured. Harness sued Thompson's estate and the estate sued Fagnan as a third party claim for contribution. Harness then filed a claim against Fagnan. Fagnan cross claimed against the estate. The case was settled without a trial and the court dismissed the action and under Rule 41 (b) that dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits. Duane Fagnan and Raymond Fagnan, Duane's father, sued Thompson's insurer, Great Central Insurance Company under a direct action statute. The case was removed to district court and a jury gave the verdict to Duane and Raymond. Great Central appealed.

DEJAMES V. MAGNIFICENCE CARRIERS, 491 F.Supp. 1276, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1980) CASE BRIEF

DeJAMES V. MAGNIFICENCE CARRIERS

491 F.Supp. 1276, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1980)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a personal injury suit in admiralty court.

FACTS: DeJames (P) sued Magnificence (D) for injuries suffered while working aboard a vessel. P alleges that certain conversion work done by Hitachi was defective. Hitachi is a Japanese company and the work was performed in Japan. Hitachi moved to dismiss for lack of personam jurisdiction in New Jersey. It was found that Hitachi lacked contacts with New Jersey and P tried to invoke a national contact standard.

FREED V. ERIE LACKAWANNA RAILWAY, 445 F.2d 619, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1971) CASE BRIEF

FREED V. ERIE LACKAWANNA RAILWAY

445 F.2d 619, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1971)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a personal injury action.

FACTS: Freed (P) was struck by an Erie (D) train. P was the head brakeman on a freight train and the accident occurred in the North Randall switching area. P and a fireman were had just dropped off their train and had started walking down a right of way adjacent to a side track when P was struck by a caboose. Second's before the accident, P's attention was diverted by the fireman who had turned and called to the engineer of the freight train to throw him is cigarettes. During deliberation the jury submitted a question to the trial court asking if the switch train was within the yard limits at the time of the accident. The court declined to answer in that it involved a question of fact. The verdict went to D and P appealed.

SHARON STEEL CORPORATION V. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) CASE BRIEF

SHARON STEEL CORPORATION V. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.

691 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983)

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the value of debentures in a sale of corporate assets. Sharon (P), corporation and trustees of liquidating trust, appealed a decision, which granted summary judgment to Chase (D), indenture trustees and debenture holders.

FACTS: UV issued debentures that because of their value were worth significantly under face value. UV decided to sell its assets and P decided to buy one part of the assets for $107 million and to assume the debentures. The total face value of the debentures was $411 million. Each instrument contains clauses permitting redemption by UV prior to the maturity date, in exchange for payment of a fixed redemption price (which includes principal, accrued interest and a redemption premium) and clauses allowing acceleration as a non-exclusive remedy in case of a default. During 1977 and 1978, UV operated three separate lines of business. In 1978, UV's Board of Directors announced a plan to sell Federal, one of the three companies. In 1979, the UV Board announced its intention to liquidate UV, subject to shareholder approval. UV distributed proxy materials, recommending approval of (i) the sale of Federal for $345,000,000 to a subsidiary of Reliance Electric Company and (ii) a Plan of Liquidation and Dissolution to sell the remaining assets of UV over a 12-month period. The proceeds of these sales and the liquid assets were to be distributed to shareholders. The liquidation plan required 'that at all times there be retained an amount of cash and other assets which the [UV Board of Directors] deems necessary to pay, or provide for the payment of, all of the liabilities, claims and other obligations . . .' of UV. Shareholders approved the sale of Federal and the liquidation plan. The sale of Federal to the Reliance Electric subsidiary for $345 million in cash was consummated. On April 9, 1979 UV announced an $18 per share initial liquidating distribution to take place on Monday, April 30. On April 26, representatives of Chase, Manufacturers met with UV officers and directors and collectively demanded that UV pay off all the debentures within 30 days or, alternatively, that UV establish a trust fund of $180 million to secure the debt. It was agreed that UV was not in violation of the debentures. On July 23, 1979, UV announced that it had entered into an agreement for the sale of most of its oil and gas properties to Tenneco Oil Company for $135 million cash. The deal was consummated as of October 2, 1979 and resulted in a net gain of $105 million to UV. In November, 1979, UV and P entered into an agreement where P purchased all of the assets owned by UV on November 26 (i.e., Mueller Brass, UV's mining properties and $322 million in cash or the equivalent) for $518 million ($411 million of Sharon subordinated debentures due in 2000 -- then valued at 86% or $353,460,000 -- plus $107 million in cash). P assumed all of UV's liabilities, including the public debt issued under the indentures. UV thereupon announced that it had no further obligations under the indentures or lease guaranties, based upon the successor obligor clauses. P delivered to the Indenture Trustees supplemental indentures executed by UV and P. The Indenture Trustees refused to sign. The issue before the courts was whether by virtue of the liquidation of UV, the debentures became due and payable. The trial judge ruled for the holders and P appealed contending that certain language in the contracts allowed for their assumption by a third party. P and the UV defendants appealed.

ISSUE:

RULE OF LAW:

HOLDING AND DECISION:

LEGAL ANALYSIS:

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